The Ethics of Evidence by Tanford, J. Alexander
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2002
The Ethics of Evidence
J. Alexander Tanford
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, tanford@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Litigation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tanford, J. Alexander, "The Ethics of Evidence" (2002). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 487.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/487
The Ethics of Evidence
J. Alexander Tanfordt
Abstract
Professor J. Alexander Tanford offers a unique perspective on the
ethics of evidence, illustrated by examples of his own personal experi-
ences as well as excerpts from film and literature. This Article is a must
read for any litigator as it addresses the issue of where the line is to be
drawn regarding evidence in the courtroom.
I. Introduction
In my first trial as a twenty-six-year-old assistant district attorney in
Manhattan, I prosecuted a nefarious criminal charged with commercial
burglary-breaking into a warehouse at night. It is rare that anyone is
caught for such a crime, but in this case, a passing police officer happened
to see the perpetrator climbing out of a broken store front window with
two fur coats in his hands while the burglar alarm blared. Commercial
burglary is not a serious crime in New York, so the defendant had been
out on bail for two years when the case went to trial. However, despite
the passage of time and the defense attorney's best efforts to make this
hoodlum presentable, my witnesses calmly and confidently identified the
young man sitting next to his attorney as the "perp."
All was going well, until the close of the People's case. The defense
attorney stood up and moved for a directed verdict on the ground that no
witness had identified the defendant as the burglar. I was confused. Had
two witnesses not identified him from the stand? The defense attorney
smiled. My witnesses had identified a fellow public defender from the
Legal Aid office who was the person sitting at counsel table. The actual
defendant was sitting in the middle of the audience. I had been duped!
The judge looked at me and offered some kindly advice that I dismiss the
case, because even if he denied the motion, the jury would never convict
after the misidentification.
A few years later, as I began to teach and write about evidence and trial
practice, I realized that the defense attorney had deliberately created false
t A.B. (1972), Princeton University; J.D. (1976), Duke University Law School;
LL.M. (1979), Duke University Law School. The author is a Professor ofLaw at Indiana
University-Bloomington.
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evidence. He had not suborned perjury, of course. Suborning perjury is
wrong. He had merely set the stage for inevitable false testimonybecause
he knew that my witnesses would assume that whoever was sitting at
counsel table was the defendant, and would therefore identify the wrong
man. His conduct had caused a miscarriage ofjustice, allowing a criminal
who had been caught red-handed to go free to prey again upon the
unsuspecting warehouses ofNew York. Surely this passive involvement
in creating false evidence was just as unethical as active subornation of
perjury. I started including a hypothetical in my classes based on this
experience.
Recently, there has been substantial publicity about DNA tests showing
that many people who were convicted for crimes were actually innocent,
despite the fact that they had been confidently identified by eyewitnesses.'
This has caused me to revisit that small New York courtroom from
twenty-five years ago and wonder about my own role. In trial after trial
as an assistant district attorney, I asked countless witnesses to "look
around the courtroom" and see if they could identify the person who
attacked, robbed, raped or sold drugs to them. Regardless of how much
defense attorneys tried to alter their clients' appearances,2 my witnesses
unhesitatingly pointed them out. Was it because they really remembered
the faces of the perpetrators, or were they just pointing out whoever was
sitting at counsel table? I, too, had undoubtedly participated in the
creation of false evidence, although it was so commonplace that I never
thought about it at the time. Could such routine courtroom testimony
actually be unethical?
Although the presentation of false, misleading or unreliable evidence
would seem to be a core concern of those who worry about our litigation
system, the ethics of evidence has been written about infrequently. In the
small body of literature that does exist, the focus tends to be limited to
the relatively easy problem of whether the Model Rules of Professional
Conduc (or their predecessor, the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
I See, e.g., JIM DwYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000).
2 My favorite defendant was a fifty-year-old prostitute whose attorney dressed her
in a brown tweed suit, brought her into court with her hair in a bun with a pencil through
it, and had her testify that she was a librarian.
3 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1983).
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bility4) prohibit an attorney from creating or using perjured and other
kinds of false evidence.5 The ethics of dubious evidence is rarely
addressed.6 By treating ethics as an issue only of what the rules say about
the knowing use of false evidence, the literature ignores the more complex
and common ethical issues concerning the use of evidence that is
misleading, incomplete, or unreliable. This Article attempts to fill some
of that gap.
II. Ethics As Principles Rather Than Rules
Most writings on the ethics of evidence approach the issue as an
analysis of rules.7 They parse the text of the Model Rules, engage in
4 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSiBITY (1969).
5 E.g., John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 334 (1989)
(asserting that the presentation of half-truths and the distortion of memory in pretrial
witness preparation seriously undermines the important truth-seeking goals of the
adversary system); Robert C. Horgan, Making Black and White Out of Gray: An
Attorney's Duty to Investigate Suspected Client Fraud, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 795,857
(1995) (stating that an attorney should not turn a blind eye to client fraud or knowingly
make a false statement of material fact or law to the tribunal); Donald Liskov, Criminal
Defendant Perjury: A Lawyer's Choice Between Ethics, the Constitution, and the Truth,
28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 881,907 (1994) (asserting that a criminal defense lawyer should
exercise every option possible when he knows of intended client perjury before
infringing ona client's fundamental constitutional rights); Angela Dawson Terry, What's
A Lawyer to Do? The Tension Between Zealous Advocacy and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 21 AM. J. TRIALADVOC. 357,359 (1997) (advising that a lawyer
should always be candid when dealing with the client, including not making a false
statement of material fact or law to the court); Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness
Coaching, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 25 (1995) (stating that a lawyer can be disciplined
by the bar for counseling or assisting a witness to testify falsely or for knowingly offering
testimony that the lawyer knows is false); Fred C. Zacharias & Shaun Martin, Coaching
Witnesses, 87 KY. L.J. 1001, 1010 (1998) (stating that the primary danger of coaching
is that the lawyer may so change a witness's presentation that the resulting testimony
is false or conveys an incorrect impression).
6 The one notable exception is Monroe Freedman's wonderful piece of devil's
advocacy, in which he analyzed whether it was ethical to discredit a witness whom one
believes is telling the truth. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the
Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469,1474
(1966).
"See Carla Messikomer,A mbivalence, Contradiction, andAmbiguity: The Everyday
Ethics ofDefense Litigators, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 739,744 (1998) (noting that lawyers
are taught and socialized to sharply distinguish "rules" from "morality," and think of
ethics as just another set of rules).
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statutory interpretation, and pose questions of ethics solely in terms of
whether an attorney is likely to be successfully disciplined! Given the
relative failure of the bar to police itself and the extreme unlikeliness that
an attorney will be disciplined,9 this seems a poor way of approaching
an issue of ethics.
Ethics are not rules, of course. They are moral principles that guide
our lives as attorneys. The decisions we have to make in litigation are
too variable and complex to be reduced to rules.'0 The Model Rules may
be the "law for lawyers," clearly defining the circumstances under which
we can be found guilty of improper conduct and disbarred," but they are
not coextensive with the concept of legal ethics.12 If we are to live as
ethical litigators, we must make decisions concerning evidence based on
more than the Model Rules-we must (and do) rely on our experience,
judgment, tradition, moral ideals, and character 3 guided by moral prin-
ciples that are supposed to push us in the direction of good lawyering.)
'See Liskov, supra note 5, at 884 (stating that, "under Model Rule 3.3(c), a lawyer
may present questionable evidence without fear of disciplinary action"); 1 GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODELRULES OF PROFESSIONALCONDUCT § 1.23 (3d ed. 2001) (stating that, even where
a violation requires proof of "knowledge," the circumstances may be such that a
disciplinary authority will infer that a lawyer must have known; the lawyer will be legally
chargeable as if actual knowledge had been proved); Wydick, supra note 5, at 22-23
(noting that unethical witness coaching subjects a lawyer "to professional discipline and,
under specified circumstances, the lawyer is also subject to criminal punishment for
subornation of perjury").
9 See Applegate, supra note 5, at 279 (noting that one rarely comes across a discipline
case or a criminal case involving unethical witness coaching; chances ofbeing reported
are low).
'
0 See Zacharias & Martin, supra note 5, at 1016-17 (stating that "deciding how to
conduct trial work within ethical boundaries established" by rules and codes is easy;
"the hard part is remembering that identifying ethical practice goes far beyond that
task"); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW (2000) (reducing legal ethics to 135
rules).
" Robert P. Lawry, Cross-Examining the Truthful Witness: The Ideal Within the
Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 100 DICK. L. REv. 563, 581 (1996).
12 See HENRY DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 2 (1953) (quoting Lord Moulton as saying
that "[true civilization is measured by the extent of [o]bedience to the [u]nenforceable").
" See Lawry, supra note 11, at 581-83 (noting that the adversarial nature of the
courts, as well as the rules of procedure, protect constitutional rights).
14 See RONALD DWORKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 24-25 (1977) (noting the
difference between legal principles and legal rules).
[Vol. 25:487
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The problem with thinking of ethics as rules arises most clearly when
the Model Rules do not explicitly prohibit a proposed course of question-
able conduct. In one memorable case in my early years, I prosecuted a
fifty-year-old prostitute for robbery after she hit one ofherjohns over the
head with a lamp and stole his wallet. Before trial, the defense attorney
had helped her get a part-time job at the New York Public Library as part
of a drug-rehabilitation program. At trial, she showed up wearing a
brown tweed suit, with her graying hair in a bun, took the stand and
testified that she was a librarian. The jury looked at me like I was insane
for accusing this nice old lady of being a prostitute. There is no ethical
rule governing misleading clothing, nor getting a client a last-minutejob,
nor telling them to wash the dye out of their hair and look their age. In
the absence of broader ethical principles, lawyers are drawn to the
position that anything that might increase their chances of winning that
is not expressly prohibited, is permitted-even required.
The problem is wonderfully illustrated by Zacharias and Martin in this
anecdote:
A standard probation condition imposed upon conviction for alcohol-related
crimes in California requires the recipient to participate in Alcoholics
Anonymous. The difficulty engendered by this condition is that Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings are (as the name implies) anonymous. Alcoholics
Anonymous provides a sign-in sheet that probationers can complete in order
to indicate their attendance. This list, however, only indicates the individual's
initial presence; it does not reflect whether the person signing the list actually
attended the full meeting. Many California probationers were believed to
exploit this loophole by presenting sign-in sheets to the court as evidence
of their attendance even when they had not, in fact, obtained the benefits of
their required participation. Various Californiajudges, upon learning of this
problem, devised a solution: they began to "quiz" probationers when they
appeared before the court to establish the completion of the terms of their
probation. Judges typically asked the defendant "What step are you on?,"
a question that any true participant in Alcoholics Anonymous would easily
be able to answer. This simple judicial inquiry often resulted in a bewildered
look on the part of the probationer and a resulting order for the continuation
of probation. California public defenders ... [met to discuss] whether they
should "prepare" their clients for the judge's anticipated questions by
"reminding" them of the various steps of the Alcoholics Anonymous
program. Public defenders who looked exclusively at the rules seemed
inexorably to come to the conclusion that they were not only allowed to so
2002]
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coach their clients, but perhaps were even ethically required to do so. The
terms of the California Rules of Professional Conduct do not flatly prohibit
informing a client of the usual questions and of what permissible answers
might entail.' 5
Conceptualizing the ethics of evidence as merely an exercise in the
interpretation of rules also stifles discussion of the hard questions. False
evidence is an easy issue. Questions about the propriety of misleading,
incomplete and unreliable evidence are harder. If we limit ourselves to
rule-thinking, we may end up saying vaguely to ourselves that "[t]here
is no Model Rules provision that expressly proscribes trickery" 16 other
than the rule against knowing use of false evidence 7 then proceeding no
further.
Rule analysis in the wrong hands can also produce very strange results.
For example:
Model Rule 1.2(e) only applies where the lawyer "knows" of the client
perjury. If a lawyer has only a belief of perjury, he or she lacks actual
knowledge. Thus, Model Rule 1.2(e) does not apply to situations in which
the lawyer has only a"reasonable belief' that the client's proposed testimony
will be perjurious. Similarly, the mandatory disclosure provisions of ABA
Formal Opinion 353 would be inapplicable absent knowledge by the attorney
that the client's proposed testimony is perjurious.... Although Model Rule
3.3(c) provides a lawyer with discretion to refuse to offer evidence which
he or she reasonably believes to be false, closer analysis reveals that refusal
is not a viable option. Other provisions in the Model Rules make it an ethical
violation for a lawyer to refuse to offer this evidence.... Rule 1.2(a)'s
command that a lawyer comply with a client's decision to testify must
logically supersede Model Rule 3.3(c). Model Rule 1.2(a) uses mandatory
language ("shall") in stating the lawyer's obligation to honor the client's
decision to testify. On the other hand, Model Rule 3.3(c) uses discretionary
language ("may") in providing that a lawyer may decline to offer suspected
perjury. Thus, when the suspected proposed perjurious testimony is that of
"Zacharias & Martin, supra note 5, at 1012-13.
"'
6 But cf People v. Fein, 263 N.Y.S.2d 629,639,24 A.D.2d 32,42 (App. Div. 1965)
(stating "that the defendant is entitled to a fair trial without trickery").
17 WILLIAM H. FORTUNE ET AL., MODERN LITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY HANDBOOK 393-94 (1996).
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the client, the lawyer has no discretion to refuse to offer it.... [A] lawyer
may never act under Model Rule 3.3(c)."'
We can do a better job of thinking about the ethics of evidence.
III. The Focus on False Evidence
Is Too Limited
Because commentators approach the ethics of evidence as a question
of rules, they usually frame the discussion in terms of one clear rule: an
attorney may not create, use or rely on evidence the attorney knows to
be false. The Model Rules explicitly prohibit knowingly using false
evidence. Rule 3.3 states that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly [m]ake a
false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal [or] offer evidence that
the lawyer knows to be false."' 9 What is there to talk about-exceptions
to the rule? That is indeed the unlikely direction in which the literature
runs. Are there exceptions that permit a lawyer to use false evidence
ethically?
Mostly, the literature is full of epistemological essays on when a
lawyer "knows" that evidence is false.2° Is a little knowledge enough, or
must the lawyer know falsity beyond a reasonable doubt? Can lawyers,
like ostriches, hide their heads in the sand to avoid knowing something?2
To the extent that the literature touches on evidence that is not false, but
merely misleading or unreliable, it simply points out that such evidence
is not known to be false, so using it will not violate Rule 3.3. Lawyers
are free to subvert justice to their hearts' content as long as they can tell
the disciplinary commission with a straight face that they did not actually
"know" the evidence was false. So far so good, if somewhat banal.
"S Liskov, supra note 5, at 885-86 (emphasis added).
'9 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.3 (1983).
20 E.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 51-57
(1975) (discussing what it means for a lawyer to "know" in both criminal and civil
litigation).
21 See Office ofDisciplinary Counsel v. Price, 557 Pa. 166, 174, 732 A.2d 599,604
(1999) (stating that counsel cannot deliberately close his eyes to avoid actual knowledge
that he is misrepresenting facts).
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But now a problem arises. The false-evidence rule addresses when
a lawyer cannot use evidence, or when the lawyer might be sanctioned,
but does not give any positive guidance for the ethical use of evidence.22
The false-evidence rule literature assumes a dichotomous ethical universe
in which whatever is not expressly prohibited must be permitted.
Obviously, no rule says this, and it is a somewhat uncomfortable result
to reach. Therefore, the discussions generally articulate an implicit rule
requiring all non-false evidence to be presented, which they derive from
the principle of zealous representation. 3
At times the discussion takes on a distinctly Orwellian tone, in which
"knowing" and "false evidence" are given so narrow a meaning that
nothing is known to be false, and zealous advocacy is given so broad a
meaning that everything dishonest and deceitful is made mandatory.
2 4
Typical examples of such discussions can be found in a pair of student
notes. In the first, the author poses the question, "What does an attorney
really 'know' about her client's intent to give false testimony, and then
answers it as follows:
[T]he question is a hard one, and requires that the attorney use "extreme
caution" in answering. The reason is that suspicion of fraud is usually raised
by the receipt of conflicting information, either from the client or in tandem
from another party. This conflict alone does not appear to constitute
"knowing," because "mere suspicion" is not enough to establish a possible
client fraud; nor is "(a) mere inconsistency in the client's story (sufficient)
in and of itself to support the conclusion" that he will commit a fraud on the
tribunal. So what constitutes "knowing"? Although one court stated that an
attorney should know, based upon her professional experience, if the client's
representations are false, not all courts have not taken such a liberal view.
22 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3.
' The principle appears in the preamble to the Model Rules as "As advocate, a
lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. pmbl. It does not, however, appear in the
Restatement, which merely requires an attorney to "proceed in a manner reasonably
calculated to advance a client's lawful objectives." RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF THE LAW
§ 16 (2000).
24 E.g., Bruce A. Green, "The Whole Truth? ": How Rules of Evidence Make
Lawyers Deceiful, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 699,706 (1992) (discussing that only the rules
against subornation limit lawyers' activities; ethical duties of zealous representation may
oblige a lawyer to use other techniques to promote the client's cause).
[Vol. 25:487
THE ETHIcs OF EVIDENCE
For example, in United States v. Long, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit said only "a clear expression of intent," evidenced by "a client's
announced plans" to commit fraud will constitute the level of knowledge
required before an attorney may reveal a client confidence. The Second
Circuit went even further in Doe v. Federal Grievance Committee... [and]
insisted upon a "clearly established" or "actual knowledge" standard, which
is met "when the client acknowledges to the attorney that he has perpetrated
a fraud upon a tribunal." .... Indeed, an attorney who, relying on suspi-
cions or inconsistencies, prematurelyjumps to the conclusion that her client
is going to commit a fraud and discloses such to the tribunal may be liable
for breaching her ethical duty to maintain her client's confidences and
secrets.... When an attorney unnecessarily discloses the confidences of
(her) client, (s)he creates a chilling effect which inhibits the mutual trust and
independence necessary to effective representation .... [A]sking the
attorney to assemble and weigh the facts so that she may "know" if her client
is committing a fraud is asking her to playjudge and jury, a role that clearly
does not belong to her.... [I]f the attorney does not "know for sure" that
the evidence is false, she should present it; and, as long as the client does
not admit that his story is false, even though "(one) know(s) in (one's) heart
of hearts" that it is false, the attorney should "suspendjudgment" and do the
best she can.25
The second author asks "When does a lawyer 'know' evidence is
false?" and comes up with this answer:
[l]f the lawyer lacks knowledge of client pejury, he or she must present the
evidence. The problem lies in attempting to draw the line between "belief'
and "knowledge." .... ABA Formal Opinion 353 requires that knowledge
be established by a "clearly stated intention to commit perjury." ... In
Whiteside v. Scurr, the court stated that "it will be a rare case in which this
factual requirement is met. Counsel must remember they are not triers of
fact, but advocates. In most cases a client's credibility will be a question for
thejury." [Imagine a] hypothetical robbery client. As the date for trial drew
25 Horgan, supra note 5, at 826-30 (citations & footnotes omitted) (discussing what
an attorney really "knows" about a client's intent to perjure) (citing State v. Zwillman,
112 N.J. Super. 6, 16, 270 A.2d 284, 289 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970); United States
v. Long, 857 F.2d 436,445 (8th Cir. 1988)) (quoting Doe v. Federal Grievance Comm.,
847 F.2d 57,62,63 (2d Cir. 1988));seealso State v. Skjonsby, 417 N.W.2d 818,825-26
(N.D. 1987) (discussing what constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel);
Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 301 Pa. Super. 187, 197 n.7, 447 A.2d 305, 310 n.7 (Super.
Ct. 1982) ("[lIt is crucial ... that the lawyer know for sure that actual perjury is
involved; he must not merely suspect it.").
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near, the client changed his story from having been in the vicinity of the
crime to having been twenty miles away at home. Based on this alone, does
the lawyer have a firm factual basis ofperjury? The client may have initially
thought that the truth would not have been believed by the lawyer... [so]
the client's change of story probably does not give the lawyer a firm factual
basis for this conclusion. "A lawyer's certainty that a change in the client's
recollection is a harbinger of intended perjury... should be tempered by the
realization that, after reflection, the most honest witness may recall (or
sincerely believe he recalls) details that he previously overlooked." '26
The abstractness and lack of reality of the discussion can be attributed
partly to the inexperience of the student authors, who have not yet
discovered that criminal clients are not often noble and innocent creatures;
but that explains only part of it. It is not just students who make this
argument.2
7
The other contributing factor is the tendency to focus on the false
evidence rule. By looking solely at this one rule, evidence either falls into
a small comer of unethical evidence that is actually and knowingly false,
or it must be ethical. Despite the fact that among the approximately
ninety-five percent of evidence that is not actually false we can find
inadmissible, unreliable and misleading evidence, half-truths, and
testimony distorted by coaching, we have failed to seriously ask whether
there are any relevant ethical principles that guide attorneys' decisions
to use evidence in the first place.
To the extent that the literature has addressed a lawyer's affirmative
obligations, it has generally assumed that there is no ethical principle
relating specifically to evidence. The authors then fall back on the
lawyer's general duties of client loyalty and zealous representation within
26 Liskov, supra note 5, at 894-98 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citing
Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1328 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd, Nix v. Whiteside, 475
U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that the right to counsel is not violated when an attorney
refuses to cooperate in presenting perjured testimony at trial)).
27 See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 6, at 1479-80 (discussing that, if a client cannot
be dissuaded from committing perjury, the lawyer should go ahead and elicit the false
testimony because of a duty to zealously represent the client); Green, supra note 24, at
706 (stating that only the rules against subornation limit a lawyers' activities; the ethical
duties of zealous representation may oblige a lawyer to do anything else to promote the
client's cause).
[Vol. 25:487
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the bounds of law.28 The problem is that neither of these principles says
anything about using misleading, unreliable or incomplete evidence.
Arguments that a lawyer is required to mislead a jury out of loyalty to a
client, or that deliberate evidentiary deception constitutes zealous
advocacy within the bounds of law, are unpersuasive.29 One should be
able to be loyal to a client, a zealous advocate, and an ethical attorney
without defrauding the jury. Is there really no ethical principle guiding
a lawyer's decisions to use evidence?
A fair reading of the Model Rules cannot possibly produce the
conclusion that the overriding ethical principle of evidence is "anything
goes." A lawyer is not given carte blanche to ask trick questions, present
unreliable or misleading evidence, or make any argument, however
deceitful, in the name of client loyalty and zealous advocacy. As one
court stated just before suspending an attorney: "Attorneys must 'possess
a certain set of traits-honesty and truthfulness, trustworthiness and
reliability, and a professional commitment to thejudicial process and the
administration of justice."'30
The Model Rules themselves place clear limits on this principle. They
do not demand unrestrained zealous advocacy designed to win at all costs,
but zealous advocacy within the bounds oflaw.3 Within that even more
limited duty, there are perfectly clear ethical limits set by Rule 8.4(c):
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to... engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." '32 This duty is
further constrained by Model Rule 3.3(c), which says a lawyer should
2 E.g., L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer 's Duty ofLoyalty, 29 EMORY
L.J. 909, 947 (1980) (stating that loyalty to the client, regardless of other constraints,
is the all-encompassing duty).
'9SeeIn re Anonymous, 346 S.C. 177, 193,552 S.E.2d 10, 18 (2001) ("[Alttomeys
face great temptation to cross the limits of acceptable behavior in order to win the case
at the expense of their ethical responsibilities.... Claiming that any such improper
behavior was merely "zealous advocacy" will not justify [it].").
'o In re Forrest, 158 N.J. 428,437, 730 A.2d 340, 345 (1999).
3 MODEL CODE OF PROF'LRESPONSIBlITY Canon 7 (1981) (stating that "[a] lawyer
should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law"); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.1 cmt. (1983) (stating that "[t]he law, both procedural
and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed").
32 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 8.4(c).
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"refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false." 33
Ethical Considerations promulgated under the superseded Model Code
of Professional Conduct reminded lawyers they were supposed to avoid
bringing about unjust results34 or inflicting needless harm on others.35
Lawyers owe a duty to the system of justice to utilize procedures that
command public confidence and respect.36 Model Rule 3.4(e) provides:
"A lawyer shall not... in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does
not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by
admissible evidence. 37
Taken together, these statements reflect an ethic quite different from
the amoral proposition that an advocate's primary duty is to win the case
for the client, constrained only by the prohibition against using knowingly
false evidence. They direct an advocate to act in good faith, to abide by
rules of evidence and procedure, to avoid conduct that will deceive ajury,
and to limit the use of evidence to that which the advocate reasonably
believes is accurate. A lawyer is not obliged or even permitted to mislead
the jury with unreliable and incomplete evidence, but must have a good-
faith basis for that evidence before presenting it in the first place.
IV. The Good-Faith Principle
The good-faith principle goes beyond prohibiting the use of false
evidence, and guides an advocate's conduct with respect to dubious
evidence which the lawyer does not know for certain is false. The lawyer
may only use or refer to evidence if the lawyer has a good-faith basis to
believe that it represents the best recollection of a witness, and can be
presented in accordance with the rules of evidence and procedure. 38 This
is a two-part standard under which an advocate must have both afactual
and a legal basis for alluding to, asking about, offering, or relying on
" Id. R. 3.3(c).
-' MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSlLITY EC 7-14 (1969).
35 Id. EC 7-10.
Id. EC 7-20.
37 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.4(e).
31 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 2.
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particular evidence. To have a good-faith factual basis, the attorney must
have both a subjective belief that the evidence represents the true
recollection of a witness, and objective support for that belief such as a
deposition, statement, report, or interview notes. To have a legal basis,
the attorney must have a reasonable legal argument that it is admissible
under the rules of evidence and procedure.
A. Factual Basis
An attorney must have a factual basis for alluding to, offering, or
relying on evidence at trial.39 That factual basis may not be wishful
thinking. There are two requirements for a factual basis-an attorney's
subjective belief, and objective evidence to support that belief.40 The
attorney's investigation and discovery must show a likelihood that a
witness exists who believes the evidence to be true, and who could and
would be called to testify to its truthfulness.4' Under this principle, an
ethical advocate will not mention dubious evidence in an opening
statement,42 will not attempt to present evidence believed to be
inaccurate,43 will not ask a leading question that includes an unsupported
factual suggestion,' and will not incorporate into closing argument
"surprise" misstatements and overstatements by witnesses that make the
39 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.4(e) (1983) (stating that a lawyer
in trial may not "allude to any matter that... will not be supported by admissible
evidence"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW § 107 (2000) (identical language).
40 See MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e).
4 See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 776 So. 2d 287,288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
that the trial court erred by allowing impeachment testimony when the attorney did not
have good faith and did not later prove).
42 See, e.g., State v. Torres, 328 N.J. Super. 77, 88-89, 744 A.2d 699, 706 (Super.
Ct. 2000) (stating that the prosecutor should not seek "tactical advantage in placing
before the jury allegations that he knew he could not prove"); Lillard v. State, 994
S.W.2d 747, 750-51 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (noting "[t]he prosecutor should not mention
matters in his opening statement which would be inadmissible as evidence").
43 See, e.g., State v. Galloway, 145 N.C. App. 555,559,551 S.E.2d 525,529-30 (Ct.
App. 2001).
"4See Reno v. State, 514 N.E.2d 614,616-17 (Ind. 1987) (ruling that the insinuation
that a witness was "stoned out offher mind" was improper unless the attorney had a good-
faith basis).
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case seem more favorable than it is. 45 By requiring both a subjective and
objective factual basis, we avoid the superficial argument that, because
lawyers can never really "know" whether evidence is true or false, there
are no ethical impediments to introducing dubious evidence regardless
of objective indications of its unreliability.46
First, an attorney must have a subjective belief that proposed evidence
reflects the genuine recollection of a witness and is not a fabrication.'
This is not the same thing as whether the attorney personally believes the
evidence is true. I once defended a man who was caught shoplifting food
who claimed to be a field operative for the CIA on a training mission to
see if he could survive in a strange city for a month with no money and
no identification. He wanted me to inform the judge that a conviction
would jeopardize his security clearance. He stuck to this story despite
my skepticism. I called the CIA to explain the situation and ask if they
could verify his claim, but of course they denied any knowledge of this
guy. Did I personally believe his story? No. Did I believe that my client
genuinely thought he was in the CIA? Yes, although I also thought he
was crazy.
Second, an attorney must have an objective basis for his decision to
allude to evidence in opening statement or attempt to elicit it from a
witness.48 Wishful thinking, intuition and impressions based on demeanor
are not adequate to justify using or alluding to evidence. 49 The attorney
must be able to point to documents, statements, records, or depositions
that indicate that an identifiable witness exists who has stated in the past
that a particular fact is true, could be called to testify, and has been
415 See, e.g., People v. Olivero, 710 N.Y.S.2d 29, 30, 31,272 A.D.2d 174, 175-76
(App. Div. 2000) (holding that "[t]he prosecutor's sunnation marks were prejudicial
because she stressed that it was 'important' and 'significant' that [the defendant]'s
signature was on the stipulations"); People v. Kopczick, 312 II. App. 3d 843, 850-51,
728 N.E.2d 107, 113-14,245 Il. Dec. 376,382 (App. Ct. 2000) (holding nonevidential
comments may be corrected by jury instruction and the verdict will not be set aside
unless resulting in substantial prejudice).
4 Zacharias & Martin, supra note 5, at 1009.
47 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (1983).
" See, e.g., Reno v. State, 514 N.E.2d 614, 616-17 (Ind. 1987).
49 FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 17, at 402-04.
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reasonably consistent in his assertions.5" Unrecorded statements from a
client made during interviews satisfy the objective basis test, even though
they may be unrecorded and confidential. The requirement of an
objective basis is not for the purpose of proving to a court or disciplinary
committee that one was acting in good faith, but is required for an
advocate's own ethical judgment. Thus, confidential information gained
from the client or through the attorney's work-product can supply that
objective basis. Once a witness has in fact testified to something, the trial
testimony itself supplies the objective, although not the subjective, basis
for relying on the evidence in closing argument.
Third, the attorney must have a basis for believing the witness will
actually show up in court and testify to his recollections." It is not
enough that the client is certain his friends will show up, or that the
opponent has put someone's name on a witness list. The attorney must
be satisfied that the witness will actually testify. Serving a subpoena on
a witness or obtaining the witness's firm promise to attend is usually
adequate,52 although there may be circumstances where mere service of
a subpoena is not enough.53 In the movie Suspect, the public defendant
has a private investigator track down a homeless man with no fixed
address whom she believes can supply her client with an alibi.' The
witness stabs the investigator, throws away the subpoena, and disappears
-'See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 772 A.2d 818, 823 (D.C. 2001) (involving a
prosecutor who based cross-examination questions about a defendant's criminal record
on a Pretrial Services Agency report); Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787,805
(Ky. 2001) (finding it good faith to ask about a conviction, even though it had been
dismissed, because the prosecutor had documentation showing the existence of the
conviction); Alexander v. State, 270 Ga. 346, 349-50, 509 S.E.2d 56, 60 (1998) (ruling
that, when the prosecution fails to produce evidence to support the opening statement,
the prosecutor has the burden of establishing a basis for the opening statement to avoid
a mistrial).
SI See, e.g., People v. Austin, 605 N.Y.S.2d 103, 104, 199 A.D.2d 325, 325 (App.
Div. 1993) (finding that the prosecutor was not acting in bad faith when he served a
subpoena on the defendant's wife).
52 Id.
s3 See State v. Torres, 328 N.J. Super. 77, 95,744 A.2d 699, 708 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2000) (arguing that a hearing should have been held on whether an accomplice
would assert the Fifth Amendment privilege).
'4 SUSPECT (TriStar 1987).
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into the night. The judge correctly cautions the attorney not to mention
this missing witness to the jury because in all likelihood he will never be
found and mentioning him would contaminate the trial process."
B. Legal Basis
The admissibility of evidence is controlled by rules of evidence and
procedure. It is therefore obvious that an attorney must also have a legal
basis for asking a question or offering evidence.56 She must have a
reasonable belief that the evidence is admissible.
A lawyer should not attempt to get before the jury evidence which is
improper. In all cases in which a lawyer has any doubt about the propriety
of any disclosures to the jury, a request should be made for leave to approach
the bench and obtain a ruling out of the jury's hearing, either by propounding
the question and obtaining a ruling or by making an offer of proof.
57
For example, it would violate this principle to ask a witness ifhe has been
convicted of drunk driving (even if true) because the rules of evidence
limit impeachment to felonies and crimes of dishonesty.58 It would also
violate this principle to ask a question alluding to inadmissible evidence
and then "withdraw" it if the other side objects.5 9 As one court found,
it is improper for an attorney to ask a question "which he knows, and
every judge and lawyer knows, to be wholly inadmissible and wrong."
55id.
6 See, e.g., Flowers v. State, 773 So. 2d 309, 326 (Miss. 2000) (holding that cross-
examination questions must have an evidentiary basis).
17 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCT R. 19(g)
(1972). Accord State v. Smallwood, 594 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. 1999) (finding
misconduct for a prosecutor to offer inadmissible evidence to the jury).
s See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609; see also Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d
108, 130, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713, 727 (Ct. App. 1974) (holding a lawyer in contempt for
deliberately asking a question about an inadmissible misdemeanor conviction).
9See, e.g., State v. Lawton, 164 Vt. 179, 183-84, 667 A.2d 50,55 (1995) (finding
that the character acts introduced by the prosecutor were highly prejudicial and of no
relevance to the facts).
6 People v. Wells, 100 Cal. 459, 463, 34 P. 1078, 1079 (1893).
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This is a principle guiding an attorney's decision to attempt to
introduce evidence. The ethics of offering evidence depend on an
attorney's legal analysis prior to the offer, not on what happens after-
wards. It is unethical for an attorney to offer evidence she believes to be
inadmissible on the chance that the opponent will not object or the judge
will rule unexpectedly in her favor." However, it is not unethical to
introduce evidence the attorney thinks is admissible just because an
objection is later sustained.62 Lawyers and judges will frequently have
legitimate disagreements on the admissibility of evidence.
This part of the good-faith principle similarly should have both a
subjective and objective component. The attorney must be able to point
to a rule of evidence that plausibly supports the item's admissibility, and
also have a subjective belief that the evidence properly be admitted under
that rule.
C. Duty to Investigate Factual and Legal Bases
The only way an attorney can develop a good-faith basis for evidence
is to conduct an investigation into its reliability and admissibility. Indeed,
without an investigation, the attorney would have no evidence to present.
No competent attorney would dream of presenting a case to aj ury without
having investigated it or filing a pleading without legal research. The
general professional duty to investigate the facts and law is obvious and
fundamental to professional responsibility, and its application to the
presentation of evidence would seem uncontroversial.
However, what should be a simple issue has been made complicated
by the tendency to assume that the only two ethical considerations
governing evidence are the prohibition against false evidence and the duty
of zealous loyalty to the client.63 When the duty to investigate is analyzed
61 See Onstad v. Wright, 54 S.W.3d 799,807-08 (Tex. App. 2001) (concluding that
the introduction of evidence known to be inadmissible is sanctionable even if the
opponent does not object).
62 See, e.g., Daniels v. United States, 738 A.2d 240, 248 (D.C. 1999) (finding no
prosecutorial misconduct because of the good-faith belief that the statement would be
admissible).
63 See Horgan, supra note 5, at 800 (noting the attorney's duty to investigate
suspected client fraud is undefined so it may be ignored).
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solely with reference to these two rules, strange results start appearing.
Some commentators have actually come to the conclusion that, if an
attorney believes an investigation would show that a client's proposed
testimony was pejurious, the attorney should not conduct the investiga-
tion. In that way the attorney will be able later to deny actual knowledge
of the falsity of the evidence and may ethically present it, all of which is
justified as zealous loyalty to the client. Investigating the truth of
evidence coming from one's client is thejob of the jury, not the attorney.
Requiring the attorney to do the fact-finder's job "perverts the structure of
our adversary system" because the attorney "who judges a client's truthful-
ness does so without the many safeguards inherent in our adversary system."
The attorney would not have the insight of "fellow fact finders," so she may
give a piece of evidence or a statement more credit-or less-than what it is
due. On the other hand, a "jury's determination on credibility is always
tempered by the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A lawyer,
finding facts on [her] own, is not necessarily guided by such a high stan-
dard." . ... In our justice system, an attorney should have no duty to
investigate her client unless "fraud or perjury has been converted into an
undeniable conclusion" by information received other than through cross-
examination or interrogation of one's own client. After all, under our system,
an attorney is "the defendant's only advocate. [She] cannot also become his
accuser. A conviction, under our system, must be at the hands of the jury,
not the defendant's lawyer."
The argument is unpersuasive 6' and proceeds from the false premise
that the only relevant ethic is that zealous representation requires the
presentation of all evidence not known for sure to be false. There are
other relevant ethical principles that can address the question of whether
failure to investigate a client's suspicious testimony can somehowjustify
using the evidence. One such additional rule is that positions asserted
before a court must be based on reasonable inquiry and research.66 It is
improper to present false evidence to a court when its falsity would have
641d. at 842-45.
65 See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Price, 557 Pa. 166, 175,732 A.2d 599,604
(1999) (affirming that counsel cannot deliberately close his eyes to avoid actual
knowledge that he is misrepresenting the facts).
"See Price, 732 A.2d at 605-06 (holding itunethical to state as facts things ofwhich
counsel was ignorant because he had not investigated them).
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become certain from minimal investigation regardless of the reason the
lawyer failed to investigate.6'
A trial attorney's duty to investigate the case is not derived from the
duties to refrain from using false evidence and provide zealous representa-
tion. It exists separately and on equal footing with the false evidence and
zealous advocacy rules. Model Rule 1.1 provides: "A lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation." The commentary explains:
"Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and
analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem [and] also
includes adequate preparation." The A.B.A. Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice explain that effective representation
at trial requires thorough investigation and preparation before trial,
including locating and interviewing witnesses, obtaining independent
laboratory analysis of forensic evidence, requesting discovery, talking to
police who investigated the event, and investigating the client's back-
ground and version of the story. °
The duty of zealous representation surely does not override the duty
to provide competent representation. Competent representation includes
both investigation and preparation.
[U]nless the lawyer is prepared in a given case, the client will suffer. Proper
preparation or attention to the details of the matter, both to the law and facts,
is mandatory.... [Adequate preparation] encompasses knowledge of the
current law on the subject, ascertainment of the facts from the client, inde-
67See FED. R. CIv. P. 1 l(b)(3) (stating that, by signing a pleading, an attorney "is
certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information and belief, formed after
an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, the allegations and factual contentions
have evidentiary support"); see also Horgan, supra note 5, at 834-35 (arguing that
positions taken before a court must be based on reasonable inquiry) (citing Bird v. Bird,
509 N.E.2d 289, 292 (1987)).
63MODELRULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.1 (1983); see also STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-4.1. (2d ed. 1980) (noting the duty of
an attorney to thoroughly investigate all matters "relevant to guilt and degree of guilt
or penalty").
69 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5.
70 STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE commentary to
Standard 4-4.1.
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pendent investigation, and employment of necessary discovery proceedings
after a suit is started.... The attorney must... make an adequate investiga-
tion of the facts, both as they are favorable and unfavorable to the client."
The failure to investigate alone has been held to be sanctionable 72 and to
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel."
There is room for disagreement about how much investigation is
enough. Horgan suggests: "[S]ome courts have considered such factors
as: the resources available to the attorney; the reliability of the informa-
tion provided by the client or other counsel; the experience of the
attorney; the attorney's access to the necessary facts; and any time
constraints."'74 However, conducting no investigation at all into dubious
evidence is clearly unacceptable. 7' These principles of legal ethics and
professional responsibility do not vanish when the issue is either
suspected client perjury or concerns about other aspects of the admissibil-
ity of evidence.
V. Are There Different Ethical Standards for
Criminal Defense Attorneys?
A number of commentators suggest that a criminal defense attorney
is held to a lower ethical standard than other attorneys.76 Much of the
7' Lee Gaudineer, Ethics and Malpractice, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 88,98, 108-09 (1977).
72 See, e.g., Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 690-96 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding
that the failure to interview any res gestae witnesses before trial was incompetent and
ineffective because potentially exonerating defenses were not explored and developed).
" See Shack v. State, 231 N.E.2d 36, 44 (Ind. 1967) (stating that the attorney's
failure to conduct adequate factual investigation, double-check client's story, or research
the law constituted malpractice "as matter of law").
74 Horgan, supra note 5, at 836-37; see also Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc.,
838 F.2d 600, 605 (1st Cir. 1988) (recognizing a higher standard for an attorney
associated with a major law firm with large resources).
75 See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION commentary to § 3.2 (197 1)
(stating that, to deter a client from providing information that might "handicap the
lawyer's freedom in calling witnesses or in otherwise making a defense, is 'most
egregious' and is advocated only by unscrupulous lawyers").
76 E.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 37; Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True
Look False and the False Look True, 41 Sw. L.J. 1135, 1145-47 (1988); Charles W.
Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 854-55 (1977).
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discussion concerning whether a lawyer has a duty of zealous loyalty to
a client that permits the ethical use of misleading, unreliable or false
evidence focuses on the representation of criminal defendants. Prosecu-
tors and civil lawyers are either ignored or distinguished from criminal
defense attorneys. For example, Fortune, Underwood and Imwinkelried
summarize the conflicting opinions about whether it is unethical for a
lawyer to call witnesses for the purpose of creating a false impression as
follows: "Perhaps the best that can be said is that a criminal defense
lawyer may call the witnesses, a prosecutor may not, and civil lawyers
should not. ' "7
The suggestion of a different standard for criminal defense attorneys
is implausible. There is certainly no general ethical principle permitting
attorneys to practice deception, fraud, and trickery in order to further the
important social goal of returning violent criminals to the streets
regardless of guilt. Nor does a criminal defense exemption exist in the
Model Rules. The provisions concerning the duty to investigate,78
confining one's zealotry to the bounds of law,79 the prohibition against
false evidence, ° declining representation that would result in a violation
of law or other fraud, 1 exercising independent judgment that includes
moral factorss2 and acting in good faith 3 make no distinction between
criminal and civil cases.'
77 FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 17, at 369.
78 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT . 1.1 (1983).
'9 Id. preamble.
80 Id. R. 3.3.(a)(4). The commentary notes that there is a debate about whether a
criminal defense lawyer is under a different obligation, but it does not endorse the view,
instead stating that "[t]he general rule-that an advocate must disclose the existence of
perjury with respect to a material fact, even that of the client-applies to defense c6unsel
in criminal cases." Id.
S Id. R. 1.16.
12 1d. R. 2.1.
3 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e).
Model Rule 3.1 does make a distinction, permitting a criminal defense lawyer to
plead not guilty despite knowledge that the client is guilty and require the state to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1.
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Then where does the claim come from? Selinger believes its propo-
nents derive the claim of special rules for criminal defendants from the
burden of proof.
The argument would be that [making the prosecution overcome false
evidence] is just another legitimate way of putting the prosecution to its
proof-of making sure that the prosecution is not getting into a dangerous-to-
the-innocent habit of bringing criminal charges on weak evidence-which
a defense lawyer is clearly permitted to do, under Model Rule 3.1, even on
behalf of an admittedly guilty client."'
The problem is that false evidence does no such thing. It does not simply
put the prosecution to its proof. "[IUt is one thing to attack a weak
government case by pointing out its weakness. It is another to attack a
strong government case by confusing the jury with falsehoods. '16
The claim of a special rule for criminal lawyers also is sometimes tied
to the defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of
counsel. For example, Horgan argues that criminal defense attorneys are
specially exempt from the rule requiring that attorneys disclose fraudulent
evidence:
[T]rust between attorney and client . . is the "cornerstone of the
adversary system and effective assistance of counsel." A client ... is
unlikely to divulge all the information necessary for his defense if he feels
that the attorney would violate the attorney-client privilege and pass the
information on.... If the client withholds information, the truth cannot be
ascertained, nor can the attorney fulfill her duty of candor to the court. This
creates a catch-22. A client can fall into one of three categories: (1) one
about whom the attorney has no suspicions; (2) one whom the attorney
suspects of fraud; or (3) one whom has admitted his fraudulent intent (or it
has been conclusively proven). If nondisclosure is not afforded to a client
in the third group, a client in second group would be reticent to come forward
with exculpatory facts that, although true, cannot be substantiated because
of the client's fear that he may move into the third group and lose the
protection of nondisclosure. If nondisclosure is not afforded to the second
"sCarl M. Selinger, The "Law" on Lawyer Efforts to Discredit Truthful Testimony,
46 OKLA. L. REV. 99, 103-04 (1993).
s6 Harry Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission:" Reflections on the
"Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 148 (1987).
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group, the same fear would hold true for a client in the first group. There-
fore, nondisclosure can only serve its intended purpose if it is extended to
all three groups.
An attorney trying to uncover suspected client fraud can do so "only if
the client trusts the lawyer with information that might be embarrassing or
incriminating." If the client knows the attorney has a duty of disclosure, that
trust will never develop; therefore, the attorney may not gain the information
necessary to uncover the fraud. Disclosure may also "prejudice the
defendant in the very matter in which the lawyer is employed to defend him."
Admittedly, it is hard to have sympathy for a client who is actually guilty
of perpetrating a fraud on the court; but if the attorney's suspicions turn out
to be wrong and the client is not guilty of fraud, the harm to the client may
be irreparable. This is a risk too great to take.87
Such commentators define effective assistance as helping a criminal
defendant gain an acquittal, even if the accused committed the crime.
Therefore, the lawyer must be allowed to do whatever is necessary to get
his guilty client acquitted. This is a distortion of the right to counsel.
Nothing in the language concerning effective assistance of counsel
suggests that effectiveness is measured solely in terms of whether the
defendant is acquitted, nor does a defendant have a right to an acquittal
regardless of guilt. The argument of a special obligation for defense
attorneys to assist their clients in presenting peIjured testimony misper-
ceives the professional advocate's function.
[D]efense counsel's paramount duty [to his client] must be met in conjunc-
tion with, rather than in opposition to, other professional obligations. Counsel
does have an "obligation to defend with all his skill and energy, but he also
has moral and ethical obligations to the court, embodied in the canons of
ethics of the profession." The ethical strictures under which an attorney acts
forbid him to tender evidence or make statements which he knows to be false
as a matter of fact. His activities on behalf of his client are circumscribed
by the principles and traditions of the profession and may not include
advancing known false testimony in an effort to win his client's cause.
It is clear [in this case] that counsel felt, based on his trial preparation,
that the eleventh-hour change in appellant's story would result in his client's
7 Horgan, supra note 5, at 853-55; see also Liskov, supra note 5, at 891 (stating
that an attorney with a mere belief or suspicion of client perjury may not refuse to offer
this testimonybecause such a beliefis "insufficient to overcome a client's constitutional
rights to effective assistance of counsel").
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testifying falsely. Confronted with such a realization, counsel's obligation
to both his client and the court is to use "all honorable means to see that
justice is done," rather than to go to any lengths in an effort to see that a
defendant is acquitted."8
VI. The Ethics of Evidence
Under the Good-Faith Principle
In the following sections, this Article examines the ethics of evidence
using the good-faith principle as the unifying theme, rather than focusing
on the more limited false evidence rule. I am not discarding the rule
against false evidence-it is obviously part of good faith not to offer false
evidence; however, the false evidence rule alone does not address issues
of misleading, unreliable, or incomplete (but not false) evidence. Using
the good-faith principle avoids the use of dubious evidence that is not
clearly prohibited by the false evidence rule. Note that, without the good-
faith principle, the evidence would be otherwise permitted because no
other ethical principle restricts a lawyer's use of it.
A. False Evidence
The problem of false evidence comprises three different issues. One
is easy-May a lawyer intentionally create false evidence? No. 9 The
second issue is also relatively easy-If a lawyer discovers that evidence
is false, but did not personally fabricate it, may the lawyer present it
anyway? The answer is again "No." The third issue is only slightly
more difficult-If the lawyer discovers too late that evidence is false, and
Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 437-38 (D.C. App. 1976) (citations
omitted).
19 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
LAwYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 30.5,
at 30-8 (Supp. 1994) (stating that, while actual knowledge leaves lawyers considerable
room for doubt without the necessity ofknowing, lawyers may not practice self deception
or deliberately evade knowledge).
90 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3. cmts. 10-11 (1983) (requiring the
lawyer to reveal the false testimony to the tribunal); see also HAZARD & HODES, supra
note 89, § 30.6 at 30-9 to 30-10 (The ABA position holds that the client's interest must
be sacrificed to preserve the integrity of the system.).
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the jury has already heard it, may the lawyer remain silent and allow the
case to be decided upon the false evidence? The answer is again "No."'
All three issues have been the subject of numerous articles, and there is
not much debate about the correct answers.
A weak argument has occasionally been made that, ifa criminal client
has fabricated false evidence, an ethical lawyer might be able to present
it or allow it to go uncorrected.92 Presently, under both the good-faith
principle and the false evidence rule, it is unethical to present or rely on
such evidence known to be false.
1. The Intentional Creation of False Evidence
It is common knowledge that fabricating false evidence and the
outright subornation of perjury is wrong, unethical, and illegal. The fact
that a lawyer may not create false evidence and then offer it at trial is so
ingrained within the legal profession that it seems at best an overkill to
codify this rule. However, Model Rule 3.3 does: "A lawyer shall not
knowingly [o]ffer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.9 3 Rule
3.4 repeats this admonition by mandating that "[a] lawyer shall not
[flalsify evidence, [or] counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely."94
A lawyer's duty not to present false evidence has always been a clearly
understood, fundamental principle.95 To be explicit, the Model Rules
forbid attorneys from personally fabricating evidence96 or inducing
another to do so.9
7
9' MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4).
9 E.g., Freedman, supra note 6, at 1479-80.
93 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuT R. 3.3(a)(4).
94 Id. R. 3.4.
91 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW § 118 (2000) (stating that a lawyer may not
falsify evidence); see also Dodd v. Fla. Bar, 118 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla. 1960) (stating that
no breach of professional ethics causes more harm to the administration ofjustice than
an attorney using false testimony).
" See In re Jones, 5 Cal. 3d 390,400,487 P.2d 1016, 1022, 96 Cal. Rptr. 448,454
(1971) (discussing the discipline of a lawyer who altered and antedated a document and
offered it at trial).
97 Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Devall, 59 Cal. App. 230, 234, 210 P. 279, 280
(1922) (suspending a lawyer who advised a friend of a decedent to change the will to
reflect the decedent's true intentions).
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Evidence fabrication on a grand scale is probably rare. Attorneys do
not routinely hire actors to pretend to be eyewitnesses or to forge
documents. However, evidence fabrication on a small scale is far more
common. The scale does not matter. An Assistant United States Attorney
in Florida was disciplined merely for listing a witness under a pseudonym
in an effort to protect the witness from her ex-husband. The only false
evidence was the witness's name. The Florida Supreme Court held that
this was presenting false evidence and a violation of the attorney's
professional duty.9"
Fabrication most commonly occurs during witness coaching, when an
attorney asks a witness to change some aspect of his or her testimony to
make it more persuasive." Coaching that results in fabrication often
sounds like this:
Lawyer: How did it feel?
Client: It hurt pretty bad.
Lawyer: We're not going to get a lot of money for that answer.
Look, when I ask you that question at trial, I want you to say
that it felt like your hand was stuck on a hot stove and you
couldn't get it off, okay?
Client: Sure.
Wydick further breaks this kind of witness coaching down into two
categories, or grades." Grade One coaching occurs "when the lawyer
knowingly and overtly induces a witness to testify to something the
lawyer knows is false."' 0 ' Grade One coaching is, of course, unethical0 2
and may even constitute criminal subornation of pejury.0 3
9 Fla. Bar v. Cox, 794 So. 2d 1278, 1284 (Fla. 2001).
9 See In re Eldridge, 82 N.Y. 161, 171 (N.Y. 1880) (holding that a lawyer's duty
"is to extract the facts from the witness, not to pour them into him").
"° Wydick, supra note 5, at 18-24.
101 Id. at 18.
02 Model Rule 3.4 states, in part, that a lawyer must not "counsel or assist a witness
to testify falsely." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (1983).
03 Under the federal perjury statutes, a lawyer can be punished for suborning perjury
if the following conditions are met: (a) the witness testified under oath or affirmation
about a material matter, (b) the testimony was false, (c) the witness knew it was false,
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Grade Two witness coaching is the same as Grade One, except that the
lawyer... covertly induces a witness to testify to something the lawyer
knows is false. "Covertly" is used to mean that the lawyer's inducement is
masked. It is transmitted by implication. Grade Two witness coaching is
no less harmful to the court's truth-seeking function than Grade One, nor
less morally corrosive, nor less in breach of the lawyer disciplinary
rules... . "
One might assume that the practice of deliberately creating false
evidence is so obviously unethical that it is universally condemned, but
one would be wrong. In at least one context, respectable lawyers advise
doing just that. The ABA Journal provides this advice: When hiring an
expert consultant to evaluate a file and render an opinion, provide the
expert only "enough information so that the expert will be well prepared,"
but withhold "materials that would open the door to... cross-examina-
tion. ' '  In that way you will assure that only "helpful opinions are
reached."'" Similar advice appears in the ABA's publication Litigation:
An attorney should not give an expert unfavorable facts or documents
unless "you do not mind if the opposition does learn or see them."'1'
Giving incomplete information to an expert to assure a favorable opinion
is blatant participation in the creation of false evidence.
2. Discovering False Evidence Before Trial
Although it is rare for attorneys to personally create false evidence,
it is far more common for them to be presented with false evidence
created by others. A party to an action may fabricate favorable evidence
to improve the chances ofwinning. Family and friends mayprovide false
alibis. A battered woman may recant her statement that her boyfriend has
beaten her. These situations also seem to be easy cases. It is unethical
(d) the lawyer induced the witness to give the testimony, (e) the lawyer knew it was false,
and (f) the lawyer knew that the witness knew it was false. See Boren v. United States,
144 F. 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1906).
o Wydick, supra note 5, at 3.
loS James E. Daniels, Managing Litigation Experts, 70 A.B.A. J. 64, 64-66 (1984).
106 id.
"07 Peter I. Ostroff, Experts: A Few Fundamentals, LMG., Winter 1982, at 9.
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for an attorney to present false evidence. Whether the attorney has
personally created it is irrelevant. A "lawyer shall not knowingly... offer
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false"' °8 regardless of the source
of that evidence. Lawyers cannot present false and perjured evidence.
For some reason, however, some commentators seem to have a hard
time with this basic ethical principle when it is a client who has created
the false evidence and wants the lawyer to present it. A few have taken
the lawyer-as-whore position, and argued that the lawyer must go along
with a client's decision to commit perjury, and must present that false
evidence at trial. "o9 For example, Liskov argues that the general principle
in Model Rule 1.2(a) that the "lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
... whether the client will testify" extends to a client's decision to testify
falsely, despite other language in Rule 1.2(d) forbidding the lawyer to
"assist a client in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent."" 0
The best known proponent of this view is Monroe Freedman. He has
argued that, if a client cannot be dissuaded from committing perjury, the
lawyer should go ahead and elicit the false testimony and rely on it in
closing argument. Freedman rests his argument on the lawyer's duty of
loyalty to the client, but in the process reduces that duty from a profes-
sional one to that of co-conspirator and criminal accomplice."'
It has also been suggested that the lawyer has an obligation to present
false and perjured evidence because the client has a "right to testify."'"12
Of course, there is no such right. The client, like every witness, only has
the right to testify in ways consistent with the rules of evidence and
procedure, and has no right to provide testimony in violation of those
rules. 13 Rules 601-03 restrict witnesses to testifying under oath, which
'0' MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (1983).
"o See id. R. 1.2(a).
'Id. R. 1.2(d); see Liskov, supra note 5, at 884-93 (discussing that the lawyer may
present and argue the client's testimony to the jury and that the rule against false
evidence is not mandatory).
.. Freedman, supra note 6, at 1479-80; MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS' ETHICs 119-21 (1990).
..2 See Liskov, supra note 5, at 887; Horgan, supra note 5, at 853.
"3 The client must at least comply with those rules that are "firmly rooted" in the
traditions of the trial system. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814-15, 110 S. Ct.
3139, 3145-46, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638, 651-52 (1990).
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requires that they tell the truth."4 The right to testify falsely does not
exist. 1
5
These attempts to justify a lawyer's limited use of false evidence when
it has been created by the client are indefensible. " 6 There is no exception
in the Model Rules for false evidence created by a client, and no sugges-
tion that the lawyer must suddenly abandon her personal moral judgment.
To the contrary, the ethical principles make it clear that an attorney is not
simply the client's mouthpiece. The preamble to the Model Rules is
explicit:
Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Rules
of Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law.
However, a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation
of professional peers.... A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of
clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen are usually
harmonious.... In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting
responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise
from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal
system, and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person....
Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional
and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules. 17
The Supreme Court has also been explicit. The lawyer's role is that
of a professional who agrees to fight for the client only within the bounds
of the law and ethics.
Although counsel must take all reasonable lawful means to attain the
objectives of the client, counsel is precluded from taking steps or in any way
assisting the client in presenting false evidence or otherwise violating the
law. This principle has consistently been recognized in most unequivocal
terms by expositors of the norms of professional conduct since the first
Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted by the American Bar Associa-
"4 FED. R. EvID. 601-603.
"' Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225, 91 S. Ct. 643, 645, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1, 4
(1971) (holding that the defendant is privileged to testify, "but that privilege cannot be
construed to include the right to commit perjury").
'
6 See, e.g., In re Edson, 108 N.J. 464,530 A.2d 1246 (1987) (disbarring an attorney
who allowed the client to perjure himself at trial).
"" MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 6, 7, 8 (1983).
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tion in 1908 ..... These principles have been carried through to contempo-
rary codifications of an attorney's professional responsibility.... Both the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct... do not merely authorize disclosure by counsel of
client perjury; they require such disclosure.... [U]nder no circumstance
may a lawyer either advocate or passively tolerate a client's giving false
testimony. This, of course, is consistent with the governance of trial conduct
in what we have long called "a search for truth." The suggestion sometimes
made that "a lawyer must believe his client, not judge him" in no sense
means a lawyer can honorably be a party to or in any way give aid to
presenting known perjury."
If a client creates a phony receipt, the attorney may not offer it. If a
witness offers to lie and create an alibi, the lawyer may not call that
person. If a client is going to lie from one end of his testimony to the
other, the lawyer must keep him off the stand. At least as an abstract
proposition, these principles are ethically indisputable."'
But as with witness coaching, the problem arises when the issue is
small fabrications rather than major ones. What if a client intends to
testify truthfully most of the time, but will insert one or two pieces of false
testimony here and there to strengthen the case? The attorney cannot
overreact and refuse to present the truthful evidence in order to keep the
false evidence out of the trial. Even if the attorney tries to dissuade the
client from committing perjury, and carefully steers around the false
evidence on direct examination, the attorney has no real control over
whether the client blurts out the false testimony anyway, or the topic is
raised on cross-examination. To analyze an attorney's ethical obligation
under this circumstance requires that it be divided into two different
issues. What must the attorney do before the fact, and what must the
attorney do after the fact?
If an attorney learns of a client's or other witness's intent to commit
partial perjury before trial, the lawyer's first duty is to try to dissuade that
"
8 Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166-71, 106 S. Ct. 988, 994-96, 89 L. Ed. 2d
123, 134-37 (1986).
" See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw § 120 (2000) (stating a lawyer may not
assist a witness to testify falsely, offer false evidence, make a false statement of fact,
or offer evidence as to an issue of fact known to be false, and may refuse to offer
testimony or other evidence reasonably believed to be false).
[Vol. 25:487
THE ETHics OF EVIDENCE
person from giving the false testimony. "It is universally agreed that at
a minimum the attorney's first duty when confronted with a proposal for
perjurious testimony is to attempt to dissuade the client from the unlawful
course of conduct. ' ' 120 The attorney should point out that exaggerations
and small lies are easily exposed on cross-examination and easily detected
bythejury. False favorable testimony therefore will end up hurting rather
than helping. In addition, perjury is a crime that can be separately
prosecuted, or considered by the judge as an aggravating circumstance
at time of sentencing.
2 1
If the attorney cannot convince a client not to tell small lies, the
attorney's second duty is to seek to withdraw from representation.1
2
Withdrawal would seem to be required under Model Rule 1.16(a)(1),
because continued representation "will result in violation of the rules of
professional conduct or other law," although it is not so universally
recognized as dissuasion. Some commentators have criticized the
withdrawal approach as serving no functional purpose because the new
attorney will face the same issue.2 In criminal cases, withdrawal might
not work because most defendants are represented by public defenders
or assigned counsel who will probably not be permitted to withdraw.
Withdrawal also may implicate other ethical principles, for example, if
the case is so close to trial that a lawyer cannot ethically withdraw without
20 Nix, 475 U.S. at 169. Accord MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt.,
IN 5, 7, 11 (stating "upon ascertaining that material evidence is false, the lawyer should
seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered... [and] should seek
to persuade the client to refrain from perjurious testimony [also]"); Liskov, supra note
5, at 884; Wolfram, supra note 76, at 846.
"2 Liskov, supra note 5, at 900.
'22 MODELRULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt., I 5,7, 11; ABA Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987). But see FREEDMAN,
supra note 20, at 31-32 (arguing that it would be a betrayal of confidence to refuse to
represent a client who insists on going forward with perjured testimony).
'2 See FREEDMAN, supra note 111, at 115; Norman Lefstein, Client Perjury in
Criminal Cases: Still in Search ofan Answer, 1 GEo. J. LEGALETHICs 521,526(1988)
(pointing out several possibilities should the attorney withdraw, including allowing the
subsequent attorney to become an unknowing agent ofperjury); see also Horgan, supra
note 5, at 849-50 (criticizing the withdrawal of counsel because it may alert the judge
to client fraud).
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jeopardizing the client's case. 24  Withdrawal would also seem an
inappropriate response if it is a witness, rather than the client, who plans
to exaggerate.
If withdrawal is refused or inappropriate, the attorney should attempt
to steer the direct examination around the false testimony. 25 This may
not solve the problem, however. Despite the attorney's best efforts, the
client may give the false testimony anyway-slipping it in on direct, or
volunteering it during cross-examination. 26 In these situations, the
attorney is not relieved of ethical obligationjust because the attorney has
not intentionally used false evidence. The false evidence is there in front
of the jury, and the lawyer must do something about it.' 27
B. Discovering False Evidence After the Fact
When I was an assistant district attorney in New York, I prosecuted
a case in which the victim told police he had been robbed of two hundred
dollars. Shortly before trial, he discovered the existence of the Victim's
Compensation Fund. When I asked him at trial how much money had
been taken from him, he smiled and said, "Two thousand dollars."
Despite the good faith of an attorney, false testimony happens. 128
'
24 See MODELRULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (stating that withdrawal is not
permitted if it will have a "material adverse effect" on the client); Sanborn v. State, 474
So. 2d 309, 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing to let a defendant's fifth attorney
withdraw, balancing "the need for the orderly administration ofjustice with the fact that
an irreconcilable conflict exists between counsel and the accused").
125 Some commentators have suggested a narrative approach, in which the attorney
steers directly toward the false evidence but then lets the witness testify in narrative form
when they get there. See Lefstein, supra note 123, at 542 (indicating that counsel should
direct the witness to make a statement). However, the narrative approach is explicitly
rejected bythe Model Rules, MODELRuLES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 9, and Nix,
475 U.S. at 171 (stating that, "under no circumstances may a lawyer either actively or
passively tolerate a client's giving false testimony").
26 Alan Dershowitz, Is Legal Ethics Asking the Right Questions?, 1 J. INST. STUD.
LEGAL ETH. 15, 20 (1996).
27 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW § 120 (2000) (stating if a lawyer has
offered false evidence, "the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures").
2' Another common situation is when an accomplice wrongly denies cutting a
favorable deal with the state. See Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1461 (11th
Cir. 1986).
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When an attorney discovers that false evidence has been presented to
the court, the attorney is required to take remedial action even though it
is not the attorney's fault. Model Rule 3.3 (a)(4) states: "If a lawyer has
offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer
shall take reasonable remedial measures."'29
Despite this clear statement in the Model Rules, some commentators
have argued that a lawyer is not obligated to take remedial action if the
false evidence came from the client. Several justifications are offered;
none is persuasive. Horgan suggests that taking remedial action would
violate the attorney-client privilege and have a chilling effect on the
attorney-client relationship, so an attorney should do nothing. 3 ° The
problem is that presenting false evidence is perjury, and the attorney-
client privilege does not apply to crimes and frauds.t3' Liskov argues that,
even if there is no privilege, taking remedial action would violate the
requirement in Model Rule 1.6 that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal informa-
tion relating to representation of a client unless the client consents.' 3
However, the commentary says that the rule does not apply when the
client engages in conduct such as perjury that is criminal or fraudulent.'3
Freedman suggests that acting against a client's wishes violates the right
to counsel. '4 The Supreme Court, however, has ruled to the contrary that
'
9 See also Smithv. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1463 (1 lthCir.),cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1003 (1983) ("The state must affirmatively correct testimony of a witness who
fraudulently testifies that he has not received a promise of leniency in exchange for his
testimony.").
"'
30 Horgan, supra note 5, at 838, 862 (indicating that the only requirement is to avoid
relying on the evidence in closing argument).
131 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 95 (5th ed. 1999); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW § 82 (2000) (stating that the attorney-client privilege
does not apply when a client uses the lawyer or his advice to engage in a crime or fraud).
13' Liskov, supra note 5, at 889; see also FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 31 (noting
that "the attorney's obligation in such a situation would be to advise the client that the
proposed testimony is unlawful, but to proceed in the normal fashion in presenting the
testimony and arguing the case to the jury if the client makes the decision to go
forward").
'
3 MODELRuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 11 (1983); see also id. R. 1.2(d).
'
34 See FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 29-30 (stating, "[t]he client did not choose the
lawyer," and "once the lawyer has thus persuaded the client of the obligation of
confidentiality, that obligation must be respected scrupulously").
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defendants who inform counsel of criminal acts they plan to do "have no
'right' to insist on counsel's assistance or silence."' 35 The arguments are
belied by the clear requirement that remedial action is mandatory.
Model Rule 3.3 does not say what form that remedial action must take,
and there is some debate about it. The preferred remedies for false
evidence discovered before trial-dissuasion and withdrawal-are techni-
cally available for after-the-fact discoveries, but may not be realistic. The
lawyer could ask for a recess, woodshed the client, and seek to persuade
him to withdraw the false evidence. 36 The only problem is that judges
are not generally inclined to permit attorneys to interrupt their direct
examinations in order to hold a quick coaching session with their clients
on what to say next, although this would appear to be a "critical stage"
of the proceedings at which the client has a right to counsel.137 An
attorney could also ask to withdraw in the middle of a trial, but it is
inconceivable that ajudge would permit it. It also would seem to violate
Model Rule 1.1 6(b)'s prohibition against withdrawal under conditions
that would have a "material adverse effect" on the client.
The presumptive remedy would seem to be disclosure. Model Rule
3.3(a)(2) requires that a lawyer must "disclose a material fact to a tribunal
when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent
act by the client." Perjury and presenting false evidence are criminal and
fraudulent acts. Dissuasion and withdrawal are unlikely to be adequate,
so the disclosure becomes "necessary." The commentary explains:
[Tihe rule generally recognized is that, if necessary to rectify the situation,
an advocate must disclose the existence of the client's deception to the court
or to the other party. Such a disclosure can result in grave consequences to
the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and
perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer
'3" Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 174, 106 S. Ct. 988, 998, 89 L. Ed. 2d 123, 139
(1986).
"~ This is the preferred remedy in ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Resp. Formal
Op. 87-353 (1987).
' See Mudd v. United States, 798 F.2d 1509, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Some federal
courts have suggested that a criminal defendant's right to counsel at all "critical stages"
of a trial would mean that a lawyer may consult with the client in the middle of the
client's examination.
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cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process
which the adversary system is designed to implement.
138
Although the commentary cautions that it "has been intensely debated"
whether the requirement of remedial action applies in criminal cases, 39
it does not take the position that the requirement is in fact ethically
debatable. To the contrary, the commentary rejects the suggestion "that
the advocate be entirely excused from the duty to reveal the perjury if the
perjury is that of the [criminal] client" because it would make the attorney
a knowing instrument of pejury.'4 If dissuasion has not worked, "the
advocate should make disclosure to the court."14' The disclosure
requirement is not optional; it is mandatory and applies in criminal cases
as well as civil.' 42
C. Inadmissible Evidence
One part of the good-faith basis principle is that an attorney must have
a legal basis for offering evidence. The attorney must be able to point
to a rule of evidence that plausibly supports the item's admissibility, and
also have a subjective belief that the evidence properly be admitted under
that rule. To offer inadmissible evidence is therefore unethical.
The ethical prohibition against trying to slip in inadmissible evidence
seems fairly clear under the Model Rules, though it is not stated explicitly.
Model Rule 3.4(c) states that a lawyer shall not "knowingly disobey an
obligation under the rules ofa tribunal," and the rules of a tribunal include
its evidence rules. Offering inadmissible evidence would seem to be
s MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3, cmt. 6.
9 E.g., Horgan, supra note 5, at 853 (stating that some scholars think disclosure
undermines the trust between attorney and client, which is the "cornerstone of the
adversary system and effective assistance of counsel") (citing Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d
207, 212 (6th Cir. 1981)).
'40 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 9.
41 Id. cmt. 11.
141 Id. 12; see also Nix, 475 U.S. at 174 (stating that a rule which "would require
an attorney to remain silent while his client committed perjury, is wholly incompatible
with the established standards of ethical conduct"). Contra RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAw § 120 (2000).
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knowingly disobeying court rules, as would asking an improper question
and then withdrawing it if there is an objection. 143 Rule 3.4(e) states that
a lawyer shall not "in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence." This means more than just that a lawyer may not mention
inadmissible evidence in his opening statement. An attempt to offer it
or get it before the jury would seem also to fall within the idea of an
allusion to inadmissible evidence.' 44
A lawyer should not attempt to get before the jury evidence which is
improper. In all cases in which a lawyer has any doubt about the propriety
of any disclosures to the jury, a request should be made for leave to approach
the bench and obtain a ruling out of the jury's hearing, either by propounding
the question and obtaining a ruling or by making an offer of proof.'41
An argument can be made that it is not the attorney's duty in the
adversary system to anticipate the opponent's objections and the judge's
rulings. The argument goes like this: Judges are given broad discretion
to rule on the admissibility of evidence, 46 so they might allow evidence
the attorney thinks is inadmissible. Evidence not objected to is entitled
to consideration by the jury,147 and an attorney does not know if the
opponent will object. Therefore, an attorney never "knows" for sure
whether evidence will be ruled admissible or inadmissible. This view
maybe compatible with the approach that the attorney must do everything
possible for a client except present false evidence, but it cannot be
'
43 See In re McDonald, 609 N.W.2d 418,426 (N.D. 2000) (stating that withdrawing
improper evidence after a challenge does not cure an ethical violation).
'" See, e.g., FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 17, at 379-81 (noting that counsel may
allude to inadmissible evidence by deliberately asking an improper question or
commenting on the court's rulings).
' AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCT § 18(g)
(1972).
' E.g., Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Manuilov, 742 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2001)
(referring to the "presumptive correctness" of the trial court's decision to exclude
evidence).
14' E.g., Mitchell v. State, 619 N.E.2d 961, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (allowing
otherwise inadmissible evidence to be considered when offered without timely
objection).
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squared with the good-faith principle. The attorney is offering evidence
without a good-faith basis regardless of whether the opponent is compe-
tent enough to object or the judge will rule correctly.14
The one aspect of the inadmissible-evidence problem that has received
some attention in the ethics literature is the side show. A side show is
a non-evidentiary visual display staged for the jurors' benefit that is
intended to have an influence on the jurors without ever finding its way
into evidence. The examples of this problem are drawn mostly from the
past, so it is not clear whether this is a genuine problem today. Fortune
and Underwood collected the following examples:
a. In a personal injury case in which plaintiff lost a leg, plaintiffs lawyer
left an L-shaped package wrapped in butcher paper on counsel table throughout
trial.149
b. In a case brought by a widower for the wrongful death of his wife, the
defendant's lawyer arranged for an attractive young woman to pretend to be the
plaintiff's new girlfriend, sit near him during trial, and occasionally lean over
and ask him innocuous questions, and touch him gently. 50
c. Defense counsel arranged for a look-alike to don the defendant's clothes
and sit in the defendant's place, while the real defendant sat in the back of the
courtroom. This caused several eyewitnesses to misidentify the accused.'5 '
d. In a criminal case in front of a predominantly African-American jury, the
defense attorney arranged to have boxing champion Joe Louis walk into the
courtroom in full view of the jury and shake his client's hand.'5s
Such displays are not just clever courtroom advocacy, nor are they
excusable because they do not rise to the level of presenting false
evidence. They are unethical violations of the good-faith principle
because the attorney has no legal basis for staging a side show. It is
improper under rules of procedure and evidence.
'4 See Onstad v. Wright, 54 S.W.3d 799, 807-08 (Tex. App. 2001) (showing an
attorney sanctioned for eliciting inadmissible evidence even though the opponent did
not object).
149 RICHARD UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS 331-32 (1988).
"o Id. at 332.
"' Id. at 333.
152 FORTUNE ET AL, supra note 17, at 382.
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I am concerned not only with evidence that violates the substantive
rules of evidence because it is irrelevant, unauthenticated, hearsay, and
so forth, but also violations of the procedural rules for introducing
evidence. Procedural rules govern the proper form of the questions and
answers that make up the examinations. The best known is the rule
against asking leading questions on direct examination,'53 but other rules
preclude both repetitive interrogation" and questions that are argumenta-
tive," assume facts not in evidence,"' or misstate the evidence.'
57
Despite these procedural rules, attorneys frequently ask improper
questions or make improper rhetorical comments,'58 especially during
cross-examination. For example, in the movie "Adam's Rib,"' 5 9 Amanda
Bonner defends a woman charged with the attempted murder of her
husband and Beryl Caine. In one scene, she cross-examines Beryl Caine
seeking to establish that she was having an affair with her client's
husband:
Q: Were you wearing a black silk lace negligee?
A: Yes.
Q: Speak up, Miss Cain, we're all very interested in what you have to say.
A: Yes.
Q: What else?... Shoes? Slippers?
A: Yes.
153 FED. R. EVID. 611 (c).
' E.g., Wielgus v. Lopez, 525 N.E.2d 1272, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (limiting
repetitious questioning as discretionary).
'55 E.g., McDonald v. State, 340 So. 2d 103 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976); Mark P.
Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Questioning Questions: Objections to Form in the
Interrogation of Witnesses, 33 ARK. L. REV. 438, 485 (1980).
" E.g., Hopkinson v. Chicago Trans. Auth., 211111. App. 3d 825, 844,570 N.E.2d
716,729 (App. Ct. 1991) (demonstrating that experts may assume facts not in evidence);
School City of Gary v. Claudio, 413 N.E.2d 628, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (sustaining
an objection to a question that "assumed a fact not in evidence").
15' E.g., State v. Barcomb, 136 Vt. 141, 385 A.2d 1089, 1089-90 (1978) (holding
that it was error to allow the state's attorney to misquote evidence during questioning);
State v. Staten, 271 N.C. 600, 606, 157 S.E.2d 225, 230 (1967) (holding that the lower
court erred in "allowing the state to question its own witness in a manner that amounted
to a leading misstatement of the witness' testimony").
s FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 17, at 398-401.
"5 Ruth Gordon & Carson Kanin, Adam's Rib (MGM 1949).
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Q: Which?
A: Slippers.
Q: Stockings?
A: Yes.
Q: Think again.
A: No.
Q: Nothing else?
A: Yes!
Q: What?
A: A hair ribbon.
Q: Is this your usual costume for receiving casual callers?
Prosecutor: Objection.
Defense: Withdrawn. Uh, uh, Miss Cain, you said, uh, Mr. Attinger came to
see you about-
A: -About another insurance policy. I said this already.
Q: Well, say it again.
A: Mr. Attinger came to collect on my policy and explain me another kind.
Q: You hold?
A: Straight life, 3,000.
Q: And he came to discuss?
A: Health and accident.
Q: Huh, he showed remarkable foresight in this, wouldn't you say?
Q: Miss Cain, a while ago you said, uh, urn, [to court reporter] would you
be kind enough to read me some of Miss Cain's testimony. Uh, she
just fainted, I believe, for the first time.
Court reporter: "So I guess I must have started to conk out or something.
Excuse me, to faint or something. So Mr. Attinger grabbed me-"
Q: Ah, that's it, thank you very much. You said Mr. Attinger grabbed you.
A: Yes.
Q: Had he ever grabbed you before?
A: No.
Q: Never, before?
A: No.
Q: You're aware that you're under oath, Miss Cain, and that any false
answer makes you liable to perjury.
A: Yes.
Q: Mr. Attinger had never touched you before this time?
A: Sure.
Q: Ahh!
A: We used to shake hands quite a lot.
Defense: I see. Did you enjoy it?"
160Id.
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The intentional asking of improper questions for rhetorical purposes
seems also to contravene the good-faith basis principle. The attorney
lacks a reasonable belief that the question as asked is proper, and is
therefore violating an established rule of the tribunal. 61 Overly aggres-
sive cross-examination that intimidates, browbeats or harasses a witness
is also unethical. 62
Closely related to the rhetorical question is the rhetorical objection,
also known as a "speaking objection." Under the customary rules of
evidence, attorneys may state the legal basis for an objection within the
hearing of the jury, but must make any extended argument outside the
jury's hearing. This rule is routinely tested by attorneys who make
"speaking objections" containing short arguments or summaries of
evidence aimed at the jury. In most instances, speaking objections are
clear, intentional violations of customary objection procedure, and
therefore unethical. For example:
Q: What did you see next?
A: I saw a blue car drive by that looked like the defendant's car.
Defense: Objection, irrelevant and prejudicial. We've already
established that the defendant was home with his mother, so
it couldn't have been his car the witness saw.
However, all speaking objections are not clearly unethical. For
example, an attorney might object to the opinion of a medical expert by
saying:
'This opinion is unreliable because it is based solely on the self-serv-
ing complaints of the plaintiff, made after his lawyer told him he
would need an expert to testify for him."
161 See FORTUNE ET AL, supra note 17, at 371-74.
'
6 This is reinforced by Model Rule 4.4, which prohibits using cross-examination
to harass, embarrass, or degrade a witness. It requires that lawyers respect the rights
of third persons, including witnesses being cross-examined, and refrain from using any
means "that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass" a witness. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCT R. 4.4 (1983).
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Does this objection violate the good-faith principle because it is deliber-
ately argumentative, or is it merely a restatement of the requirement in
Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that the facts or data used by
an expert must be shown to be reasonably reliable? Keeton suggests the
following solution:
Using a frivolous objection as a vehicle for expressing some argument to
the jury is a practice condemned both by rules of procedure and by profes-
sional standards. On the other hand, expressing serious objections in a
manner calculated to appeal to the jury as well as the court is generally
regarded as a proper practice, and clearly it is proper to give attention to
phrasing objections in such a way as to avoid causing an affirmatively
adverse reaction by jurors. [However, if the argumentative part of the
objection is overemphasized,] your statement is subject to the same criticism
as a frivolous objection used for making an argument. The distinction is
primarily one of degree, and great differences of opinion exist regarding such
practices.163
D. Dubious Evidence
An attorney's use of false evidence is ethically prohibited under both
the false evidence rule and the good-faith principle. However, with
respect to evidence that is not provably false but is nevertheless of
dubious reliability, the ethical standard makes abig difference. The ethics
of using evidence which is inadmissible, misleading, unreliable or
incomplete, is simply not addressed by the false evidence rule. This has
resulted either in the problem being ignored in the ethics literature, 164 or
in unconvincing arguments that attorneys must use dubious evidence to
fulfill their duty of zealous representation because the evidence is not
known for sure to be false. 165 Quite a different result is reached when one
holds these practices up to the good-faith standard.
163 ROBERT E. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICs AND METHODS 196 (2d ed. 1973).
"6 For example, the issue is not discussed in the Restatement of Law.
161 Such arguments do not usually persuade courts reviewing ethical charges. See
Fla. Bar v. Cox, 794 So. 2d 1278, 1284 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Oath of Admission to the
Florida Bar that attorney may not "mislead the judge or jury by any artifice").
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1. Misleading Evidence
The problem of misleading evidence is harder-it is neither false nor
inadmissible. What happens if an attorney-by selective use of evidence,
trickery, and half-truths-uses true evidence to create a false impression?
This issue has been discussed at length in an analysis of Monroe Freed-
man's question, "Is it proper to discredit a witness whom you know to
be telling the truth?".
Your client has been... accused of a robbery committed at 16th and P
Streets at 11:00 p.m. He tells you [he was in the vicinity] at 10:55 that
evening, but that he was walking east, away from the scene of the crime, and
that, by 11:00 p.m., he was six blocks away. At the trial, [the prosecution
calls] an elderly woman who is somewhat nervous and who wears glasses.
She testifies truthfully and accurately that she saw your client at 15th and
P Streets at 10:55 p.m.' 66
Can you attempt to destroy the witness's credibility through cross-
examination designed to show that she is easily confused and has poor
eyesight, to mislead the jury and create the false impression that she is
mistaken in her identification?
The problem is not confined to cross-examination, of course.
Misleading evidence that creates a false impression may be also be
offered on direct examination. For example, extending Freedman's
hypothetical, suppose the day of the crime was June 1, but the elderly
witness mistakenly testifies the crime took place on June 2. The client
has admitted to his attorney that he committed the crime on June 1, but
has an airtight alibi for June 2. May an attorney, in addition to vigorously
cross-examining the witness about her failing eyesight, present truthful
testimony of the client's alibi on June 2? None of the evidence is false,
but it misleads the jury and is almost certainly going to lead to an
unjustified acquittal of the armed robber. 67
'66Freedman, supra note 6, at 1474-75; see also Lawry, supra note 11; Schwartz,
supra note 76; Selinger, supra note 85; Subin, supra note 86, at 125.
67 See Mich. Ethics Op. CI- 1164 (1987) (holding that "[a] criminal defense lawyer
may present truthful alibi witness testimony, even though the lawyer knows the client
has committed the crime charged").
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Freedman thinks there is nothing unethical about presenting and
relying on truthful but misleading evidence if it is genuinely beneficial
to the client and increases his chances of acquittal.
[I]f you should refuse to cross-examine her because she is telling the truth,
your client may well feel betrayed, since you knew of the witness's veracity
only because your client confided in you, under your assurance that his
truthfulness would not prejudice him.... [T]he same policy that supports
the obligation of confidentiality precludes the attorney from prejudicing his
client's interest in any other way because of knowledge gained in his
professional capacity. [If] a lawyer fails to cross-examine only because his
client... has been candid with him, [the lawyer is using those confidences
against his client.] The client's confidences must "upon all occasions be
inviolable," to avoid the "greater mischiefs" that would probably result if
a client could not feel free "to repose [confidence] in the attorney to whom
he resorts for legal advice and assistance." Destroy that confidence, and "a
man would not venture to consult any skillful person, or would only dare
to tell his counsellor half his case." 68
Therefore, Freedman concludes, the attorney is obligated to attack the
reliability or credibility of the victim and, by extension, offer the alibi
testimony.
Yet, does not intentionally creating a false impression violate the good-
faith basis principle? If the victim has correctly identified the defendant,
counsel does not have a good-faith basis for insinuating that she is wrong
because of poor eyesight, and it is difficult to imagine that poor eyesight
is relevant to any other purpose. Poor eyesight is not a material issue in
its own right. Proving that she has poor eyesight or other physical defect
"just for the heck of it" violates both the part of the good-faith basis
principle that requires a believe that evidence is relevant, 69 and the
prohibition against using "means that have no substantial purpose other
than to embarrass" a witness.170
" Freedman, supra note 6, at 1474-75 (quoting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Formal Op. 150, and Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 Myl. & K. 98, 103, 39
Eng. Rep. 618, 621 (Ch. 1833)).
'6 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (1983).
'
70Id. R. 4.4.
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Francis Wellman's classic TheArt of Cross Examination sets a higher
ethical standard. "' The purpose of cross-examination is to "catch truth,"
not to make the false look true and the true, false:
The purpose of cross-examination should be to catch truth, ever an elusive
fugitive. If the testimony of a witness is wholly false, cross-examination is
the first step ... in an effort to destroy that which is false .... If the
testimony of a witness is false only in the sense that it exaggerates, distorts,
garbles, or creates a wrong sense of proportion, then the function of cross-
examination is to whittle down the story to its proper size and its proper
relation to other facts.... [But if] the cross-examiner believes the story told
to be true and not exaggerated... then what is indicated is not a "vigorous"
cross-examination but a negotiation for adjustment during the luncheon
hour.... No client is entitled to have his lawyer score a triumph by superior
wits over a witness who the lawyer believes is telling the truth. 72
The same is true for presenting the misleading alibi evidence. The
attorney lacks a good-faith basis for believing that evidence of his client's
alibi on June 2 is relevant to a crime that happened on the first. In the
well known words of Lon Fuller, a lawyer "plays his role badly, and
trespasses against the obligations of professional responsibility, when his
desire to win leads him to muddy the headwaters of decision, when,
instead of lending a needed perspective to the controversy, he distorts and
obscures its true nature."' 17 3 Statements and evidence by an attorney
designed to make the jury believe something which is not true is "a
species of false statements of fact to a tribunal, which are condemned by
Model Rule 3.3(a)(l)."' 74 Indeed, when the attorney first hears the
witness mistakenly give the day of the crime as June 2, the attorney has
discovered that false evidence has been presented to the jury, and is
171 FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 216 (4th ed. 1936),
quoted in Lawry, supra note 11, at 566.
172 Id.
173 Lon L. Fuller & JohnD. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report ofthe Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958).
'
74 Selinger, supra note 85, at 101; Subin, supra note 86, at 135; see Fla. Bar v. Cox,
794 So. 2d 1278, 1284 (Fla. 2001) (stating that the Oath of Admission to the Florida
Bar provides in part that an attorney "will never seek to mislead the judge or jury by
any artifice").
[Vol. 25:487
THE ETHICS OF EVIDENCE
required to take appropriate remedial action-disclose the falsity. The
attorney may not ethically take advantage of unexpected favorable false
evidence, even if the attorney had nothing to do with its creation.
2. Unreliable Evidence
Unreliable evidence poses more of a problem than either inadmissible
or misleading evidence. Unreliable evidence is not actually false, it only
might be false. Therefore, presenting unreliable evidence is not a
violation of the false evidence rule. Neither is unreliability usually a
ground for inadmissibility-reliability goes to weight, not admissibility.'75
Therefore, presenting unreliable evidence does not violate the legal-basis
part of the good-faith principle. Lawyers encounter unreliable evidence
all the time-a wife supplies her husband's alibi, an heir says the decedent
promised her the house, or a CEO denies any knowledge of wrongdoing
by junior executives. Lawyers also present that unreliable evidence all
the time, although perhaps with some vague misgivings. Is it unethical
to do so?
Two facets of the problem of a lawyer using favorable but unreliable
evidence have been addressed sporadically, if superficially, in the
literature. One thread deals with aggressive witness coaching that does
not rise to the level of a deliberate attempt to get a witness to change his
story, but probably does alter the evidence. Discussions of the ethical
limits of witness coaching usually begin with the famous "lecture" from
Anatomy ofa Murder, and end with the conclusion that, since the lawyer
has not actually suborned perjury and does not know for sure that the
client's story is false, the lawyer may ethically use the evidence.' 76 The
second thread deals with compensation to witnesses, and whether it is
17 E.g., United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 477 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (refusing to
find eyewitness identifications "inherently unreliable" and inadmissible in court);
Jackson v. Johnson, 150 F.3d 520, 526 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the reliability and
weight of a videotape were questions for the jury). The notable exception is expert and
scientific evidence, which must be shown to be reliable before it is admissible. See
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794, 125 L. Ed.
2d 469, 480 (1993).
76 E.g., Applegate, supra note 5, at 301-02; Freedman, supra note 6, at 1478-82.
But see A. Kenneth Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978 DUKE
L.J. 921, 926, 947-57 (criticizing a lawyer who subomed perjury).
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ethical to compensate accomplices or experts in exchange for favorable
evidence. These discussions usually end with the conclusion that, because
it is not unlawful to compensate these two classes of witnesses, and the
attorney does not know their testimony is false, it is also ethical.' 77
Pivotal to both of these debates has been whether the attorney knows the
evidence is false, so they have begged the main question: What is a
lawyer's ethical responsibility concerning unreliable evidence?
a. Examples
(1) Witness coaching that falls just short of suborning perjury
The following example, from Anatomy of a Murder, illustrates an
attorney's attempt to walk a fine line:
"As I told you," I began, "I've been thinking about your case during the
noon hour.... [A]s things presently stand I must advise you that in my
opinion you have not yet disclosed to me a legal defense to this charge of
murder.... In fact, Lieutenant, for all the elaborate hemorrhage of words
in the law books about the legal defenses to murder there are only about three
basic defenses: one, that it didn't happen but was instead a suicide or
accident or what not; two, that whether it happened or not you didn't do it,
such as alibi, mistaken identity and so forth; and three, that even if it
happened and you did it, your action was legally justified or excusable." I
paused to see how my student was doing.
The Lieutenant grew thoughtful. "Where do I fit in that rosy picture?"
he responded nicely.
"I can tell you better where you don't fit," I went on. "Since a whole
barroom full of people saw you shoot down Barney Quill in apparent cold
blood, you scarcely fit in the first two classes of defenses. I'm afraid we
needn't waste time on those." I paused. "If you fit anywhere it's got to be
in the third. So we'd better bear down on that."
"You mean," Lieutenant Manion said, "that my only possible defense
in this case is to find some justification or excuse?"
My lecture was proceeding nicely according to schedule. "You're
learning rapidly," I said, nodding approvingly. "Merely add legaljustifica-
tion or excuse and I'll mark you an A....
" E.g., George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: the Law and Ethics of Snitches and
Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (2000).
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He paused. "Tell me, tell me more about this justification or excuse
business. Excuse me," he added, smiling faintly, "I mean legal justification
or excuse."
"Well, take self-defense," I began. "That's the classic example of
justifiable homicide.... Then there's the defense of habitation, defense of
property, and the defense of relatives or friends. Now there are more
ramifications to these defenses than a dog has fleas, but we won't explore
them now. I've already told you at length why I don't think you can invoke
the possible defense of your wife. When you shot Quill her need for defense
had passed. It's as simple as that.... Then there's the tricky and dubious
defense of intoxication. Personally I've never seen it succeed. ... Then
finally there's the defense of insanity." I paused and spoke abruptly, airily:
"Well, that just about winds it up." I arose as though making ready to leave.
"Tell me more."
"There is no more." I slowly paced up and down the room.
"I mean about this insanity."
"Oh, insanity," I said, elaborately surprised. It was like luring a trained
seal with a herring. "Well, insanity, where proven, is a complete defense
to murder. It does not legally justify the killing, like self-defense, say, but
rather excuses it.... If a man is insane, legally insane, the act of homicide
may still be murder but the law excuses the perpetrator...."
The Lecture was about over. The rest was up to the student. The Lieu-
tenant looked out the window. He studied his Ming holder. I sat very still.
Then he looked at me. "Maybe," he said, "maybe I was insane."
Thoughtfully: "Hm.... Why do you say that?"
"Well, I can't really say," he went on slowly, "I-I guess I blacked out.
I can't remember a thing after I saw him standing behind the bar that night
until I got back to my trailer."
"You mean-you mean you don't remember shooting him? .... You
don't even remember driving home?"
"No."
"My, my," I said, blinking my eyes, contemplating the wonder of it all.
"Maybe you've got something there.' 78
"' ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER 35-47 (Gramercy Books 2000); see
also Dershowitz, supra note 126, at 22. Dershowitz commented of lectures by prose-
cutors to police:
It's not that prosecutors tell the police witnesses to lie. It's that prosecutors give
lectures at police academies, brief police witnesses, outline [for] them the parameters
of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule, and then turn a blind eye to the amazing
coincidence that virtually every search happens to fit into one of the exceptions to
the exclusionary rule.
Dershowitz, supra note 126, at 22.
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(2) Compensating lay witnesses
In United States v. Wilson, Robert Wilson created an offshore
corporation supposedly for the purpose of trading in government
securities as a tax shelter for individual investors. 79 The corporation
never actually traded in securities, and Wilson was charged with tax fraud
and related crimes. Joseph Tritt, a broker retained by Wilson, fabricated
a paper trail purporting to represent actual trades. 0
Tritt and his wife, Katherine, reached a plea bargain with the Govern-
ment. They received immunity from prosecution and a letter of agreement
from the government that they would be eligible for the so-called
"finder's fee'-substantial monetary rewards from tie Government based
on the recovery of unpaid taxes by the IRS from Wilson and his bogus
corporation."' If they "fully cooperated" and th :ir testimony was
substantially helpful in collecting back taxes, the Trius' reward could be
as high as $11 million." After reaching the agreenzc-a, the Tritts testified
at trial that they had held discussions with Wilson regarding the elaborate
measures to be taken to simulate trading losses to match the tax losses
desired by investors and had fully produced their phony notes and
documents at Wilson's request.1
83
(3) Hiring experts
The following dialog, from The Verdict, is a cross-examination of a
plaintiff's expert in a medical malpractice case.
Q: Good morning doctor. Dr. Thompson, just so the jury knows, you
never treated Deborah Ann Kay, is that correct?
A: Yes, that's correct. I was engaged to render an opinion.
Q: Engaged to render an opinion-for a price. That is correct, you are
being paid to be here?
A: Just as you are sir.
179 904 F.2d 656, 657-59 (1 Ith Cir. 1990).
'so Wilson, 904 F.2d at 657.
181 Id. at 658.
182 Id.
18 3 Id. at 657.
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Q: Are you board certified in Anesthesiology?
A: No, I'm not. It's quite common in New York State to practice....
Q: Yes, I'm quite sure it is, but this is Massachusetts. Are you board
certified in Internal Medicine?
A: No.
Q: Neurology?
A: No.
Q: Orthopedics?
A: No. I'm just an M.D....
Q: How old are you doctor?
A: I'm seventy-four years old.
Q: Do you still practice a lot of medicine?
A: I'm on the staff of....
Q: Yes, yes, I've heard that, but you do testify quite a bit against other
physicians. Isn't that correct? You are available for that, so long as
you're paid to be there?
A: Sir- yes.'
b. Witness Coaching
(1) Legal Advice
Is it ethical to give a client legal advice with the knowledge that it will
tempt the client to commit perjury? This dilemma is commonly illus-
trated by the scene inAnatomy ofa Murder in which the attorney explains
to his client that the case against him looks grim-numerous witnesses saw
him shoot Barney Quill in cold blood. His only hope is an insanity
defense. Only after the lecture does the attorney ask Manion what
happened. Lo and behold, Manion cannot recall key events-he must have
blacked out.'
This problem has been debated at length in the ethics literature as a
question of whether the lawyer is acting within the ordinary scope of
zealous adversarial representation, or has created false testimony.
Freedman argues that the lawyer has done nothing wrong. The lawyer
has an obligation to explain the law to the client and to assume the client
is telling the truth. The lawyer has no clear knowledge that this "conve-
' THE VERDICT (20th Century Fox 1982).
'
85 TRAVER, supra note 178.
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nient" evidence is actually false, so there is no ethical impediment to
using this evidence.8 6 The late Ken Pye disagreed with Freedman, and
found the lawyer's conduct an indefensible attempt to fabricate testimony,
amounting to deliberate suborning perjury. He argues that the attorney
is intentionally creating false evidence and knows perfectly well that
Manion is lying.8 7 Many other commentators havejoined this debate.' 8
The debate seems endless and unresolvable, because it is impossible to
say for certain whether a lawyer "knows" that a client's self-serving
evidence is actually false.
But it is clear that the lawyer knows the evidence is unreliable. The
lawyer has intentionally created the conditions that make it so. The
lawyer has effectively told the client what would be the most effective
lies to make up, and then left it to the client's conscience and self-interest
whether to take the hint. When the client comes up with the perfect
answers, they are highly dubious and undoubtedly more favorable than
he might otherwise have answered if he had been interviewed before
being given the lecture. The lawyer knows this, which is why he gave
the lecture in the first place. The very act of manipulation defeats the
lawyer's claim of a good-faith belief that the client's story is true. The
creation of this evidence and its use at trial would therefore be an
unethical violation of the good-faith principle. The lawyer lacks a good-
faith basis to believe the evidence is true.
(2) Leading and Suggestive Questions
A second problem with witness coaching involves the use of leading
and suggestive questions. A lawyer might use such questions intention-
" Freedman, supra note 6, at 1478-79. Freedman goes farther and suggests that
explanations about the law are good because may help a client understand what facts
are important, and thus reduce the likelihood that the client will not reveal because of
an erroneous belief they are irrelevant. Id. at 1479.
'
87 Pye, supra note 176, at 926, 947-57.
' E.g., GEOFFREY HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 443-48(2d ed. 1994); Wydick, supra note 5, at 25-37 (discussing the relationship between
witness coaching debates and the movie, Anatomy of a Murder).
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ally to try to produce "better" evidence from a witness or client than he
would provide naturally, or may use them inadvertently.
The deliberate use of suggestive interviewing techniques, like giving
"the lecture" in Anatomy of a Murder, obviously produces unreliable
evidence. Engaging in the practice to shape the testimony to make it more
favorable than it otherwise would have been makes the result unreliable
and ethically unusable.
However, the evidence obtained from an interview maybe unreliable
because the lawyer inadvertently uses suggestive interviewing techniques.
Wydick calls this "Grade Three" witness coaching, 9' where the lawyer
does not knowingly induce the witness to testify to something the lawyer
knows is false, but the lawyer's conversation with the witness neverthe-
less alters the witness's story. Indeed, psychologists have shown that the
very act of interviewing will produce distorted and inaccurate
testimony.' 9 Because interviewing is necessary and its distorting effect
on memory inevitable, it obviously cannot be generally unethical to
interview witnesses and then call those with favorable evidence at trial.' 9'
This calls for a clarification of the good-faith basis principle. What
constitutes a subjective belief that the testimony of a witness is "true?"
Because all testimony is distorted somewhat by questioning, what would
constitute "true" testimony? For purposes of applying the good-faith
principle, we cannot hold an attorney who has properly interviewed
witnesses to a higher standard of factual reliability than if the witness had
not been interviewed without creating a bizarre disincentive for an
attorney to conduct proper investigation that is at odds with the attorney's
'9Wydick, supra note 5, at 37-41.
'9 E.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile
Destruction: An Example of the Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J.
VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAVIOR 585 (1974) (indicating subjects gave
significantly higher estimates of the speed of a vehicle when asked how fast it was going
when it "smashed" into another car than when asked about it "hitting" another car). The
extensive empirical literature on the distorting effect of leading and suggestive questions
is summarized in Applegate, supra note 5, at 330-34; ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES
M. DOYLE, EYEWrNhESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 2-2 (2d ed. 1992).
'9' Wydick, supra note 5, at 41-52. Wydick suggests that lawyers adopt "non-
suggestive" interviewing techniques recommended bypsychologists to avoid inadvertent
unreliable evidence, but it is not bad faith if an attorney does not do so. We are
attorneys, not psychologists.
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duty to investigate and prepare.'92 Thus, an attorney will have a good-
faith basis that a witness's testimony is reliable and "true" to the extent
that it represents the witness's own recollection expressed to the best of
the witness's ability. The attorney lacks a good-faith basis if the attor-
ney's use of leading and suggestive questions alters either what the
witness remembers, or significantly changes the way the witness would
otherwise express it. The good-faith basis principle does not depend on
an analysis of whether the evidence is "true" or "false" in some objective
sense, but on whether the attorney has manipulated it.
(3) Aggressive Witness Preparation
In The Verdict, there is a wonderful scene in which eleven people from
a defense firm prepare their client for trial by rehearsing his direct
examination. The client is an anesthesiologist accused of medical
malpractice.
Initially, the doctor's responses to his lawyer's direct examination questions
are stiff, patronizing, and clinical. After forceful prompting, however, the
doctor is convinced to talk in emotional, human terms that suggest his caring
nature and superhuman efforts on his patient's behalf. His lawyers accom-
plish this transformation by pressing the doctor to adopt substitute terms and
phraseology that they suggest and by applauding the witness when he shows
his emotions.' 93
The prep goes as follows:
Q: What is your name please?
A: Dr. Robert Towler.
Q: You were Debra Ann Kay's doctor?
A: No, actually, she was referred to me. She was Dr. Hangman's patient
Q: Don't equivocate. Be positive. Whatever the truth is, just say it. You
were her doctor?
A: Yes.
Q: Say it.
See subsection IV.C., supra, Duty to Investigate Factual and Legal Bases.
'9 Zacharias & Martin, supra note 5, at 1002-03.
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A: I was her doctor.
Q: You were her anaesthesiologist at the delivery on May 12, 1976?
A: Well I was one of a group of medical ....
Q: Answer affirmatively and simply, please, and try to keep your answers
down to three words. You were not part of a group, you were her
anesthesiologist, isn't that so?
A: Yes.
Q: You were there to help Dr. Marks deliver the child.
A: Yes.
Q: Anything special about the case?
A: Well, when she had been ....
[Associate raises his hand]
Q: When Debby, thank you ....
A: Thank you. When Debby had been ....
Q: Remember that, Dr. Towler. Who else was with you in the operating
room.
A: Miss Nevins, nurse anesthesiologist, Dr. Marks of course, Maureen
Rooney ....
Q: What did all these people do when her heart stopped?
A: We went to code blue
Q: Would you mind explaining to the jury what that means?
A: It's a common medical expression. It's a crash program to restore her
heartbeat. Dr. Marks cut an airway in her trachea so she could get
oxygen, she and the baby.
Q: Why wasn't she getting oxygen?
A: Well many reasons really.
Q: Tell me one.
A: She had aspirated vomitus into her mask.
Q: She threw up in her mask. Now cut the bullshit, please. Just say it.
She threw up in her mask.
A: She threw up in her mask
Q: Therefore she wasn't getting oxygen and her heart stopped.
A: That's right.
Q: What did your team do then?
A: Well ....
Q: You brought 30 years of medical experience to bear, isn't that what you
did?
A: Yes
Q: A patient riddled with complications, with questionable information
on her medical charts.
A: We did everything we could
Q: To save her and to save the child.
A: Yes.
Q: You reached down into death.
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A: My god, we tried to save her, you can't know ....
Q: Good, good. 4
Where does one draw the line concerning aggressive witness prepara-
tion? No competent attorney would dream of calling a witness, especially
a client, without adequate preparation.'9
The lawyer must try to elicit all relevant facts and to help the client-who,
typically, is not skilled at articulation-to marshal and to express his or her
case as persuasively as possible.... That is done by asking questions and
by explaining to the client how important the additional information may be
to the case.... The process of preparing or coaching the witness, of course,
goes far beyond the initial eliciting of facts. In the course of polishing the
client's testimony, [some lawyers recommend] as many as fifty full rehearsals
of direct and cross-examination. During those rehearsals, the testimony is
developed in a variety of ways. The witness is vigorously cross-exam ined,
and then the attorney points out where the witness has been "tripped" and
how the testimony can be restructured to avoid that result. The attorney may
also take the role of witness and be cross-examined by an associate. The
attorney's "failures" in simulated testimony are then discussed, and the
attorney then may conduct a mock cross-examination of the associate. In that
way, new ideas are developed while all the time the client is looking on and
listening. He probably is saying, "Let me try again." And you will then go
through the whole process once more. By that time, as one might expect,
the client "does far better". In fact, after many weeks of preparation, perhaps
on the very eve of trial, the client may come up with a new fact that may
perhaps make a difference between victory and defeat.'"
The best resolution would seem to be that if the prep changes the
substance of a witness's testimony in ways that are more favorable than
the witness's unprepped testimony would have been, the resulting
testimony is unreliable as the witness's true recollection. 9 7 Ifthe attorney
is aware of the change, and especially if the attorney has deliberately
caused it, the attorney cannot ethically present it. A lawyer must either
i David Mamet & Barry Reed, The Verdict (20th Cent. Fox 1982).
'95 See, e.g., J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACrICs AND
ETHICs 258-64 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing pretrial preparation and professional
responsibilities of an attorney).
'9 FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 59-76; see also Applegate, supra note 5, at 279.
'g Wydick, supra note 5, at 39-40.
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"prep" it back to the way it was (dissuade the witness from giving the
enhanced version) or forgo proffering it. In the example from The
Verdict, the defense lawyer cannot ethically present the doctor's testimony
that Debra Ann Kay was his patient and he was her doctor, because both
pieces of evidence have come from the attorney and materially changed
the witness's natural testimony. On the other hand, where the prep merely
refreshes the witness's memory, makes him comfortable with the
examination process, or changes theform of the testimony to maximize
its effectiveness without changing its meaning, the attorney still has a
good-faith basis for believing the final product is reliable and can ethically
use it. 19' In the example from The Verdict, when the lawyer gets his client
to call his patient by name, and to say "throw up" instead of "aspirated
vomitus," he has not changed the substance of the testimony and has
conducted an ethical prep.
(4) Refreshing Recollection at Trial
Rules of evidence permit the use of leading questions, documents,
reports, depositions and other devices to "refresh" the memory of a
witness who, under the spotlight of courtroom interrogation, has forgotten
something the witness once knew.1" When does this procedure cross the
19 Id.
'"See, e.g., United States v. Weller, 238 F.3d 1215,1221-22 (10thCir. 2001); Baker
v. State, 35 Md. App. 593, 598-99, 371 A.2d 699,702-03 (Ct. Spec. App. 1977). The
classic summary of the rule is from Judge Jerome Frank in Fanelli v. United States
Gypsum Co.:
Common experience, the work of Proust and other keenly observant literary men,
and recondite psychological research, all teach us that memory of things long past
can be accurately restored in all sorts of ways. The creaking of a hinge, the whistling
of a tune, the smell of seaweed, the sight of an old photograph, the taste of nutmeg,
the touch of a piece of canvas, may bring vividly to the foreground [of]
consciousness the recollection of events that happened years ago and which would
otherwise have been forgotten .... The memory-prodder may itself lack meaning
to other persons as a symbol of the past event, as everyone knows who has ever used
a knot in his handkerchief as a reminder. Since the workings of the human memory
still remain a major mystery after centuries of study, courts should hesitate before
they glibly contrive dogmatic rules concerning the reliability of the ways of
provoking it.
141 F.2d 216, 217 (2d Cir. 1944).
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line from ethical assistance for a nervous witness to the unethical
changing of a witness's natural testimony? Does it matter if the lawyer
uses the witness's own pretrial statement to refresh, uses a statement
prepared by another, or uses a leading question invented by the attorney?
The problem is analogous to pre-trial preparation. °° As long as the result
enables a witness to fully describe the witness's own recollection, it is
ethical. For example, if the attorney uses the witness's own statement
to refresh recollection, the attorney still has a good-faith basis for
believing that the refreshed testimony is a reliable account of the witness's
own knowledge. So, too, if the attorney asks a leading question that does
no more than reflect what the witness told the lawyer earlier during
interviewing, the result is not problematic. Both of these results assume
that the attorney has an objective basis for the evidence-a statement or
interview-against which to compare the refreshed trial testimony.
Without the objective basis, the suggestiveness of refreshing memory
makes the resulting testimony unreliable as the witness's own recall.
A slightly different problem is raised if the attorney uses a different
witness's statement20 ' or a suggestive leading question based on the
attorney's overall knowledge of the case, to refresh memory. Ifthe result
is testimony on matters within the witness's personal knowledge and
consistent with the witness's original statement or interview, the process
is not problematic. But if the result is testimony that differs from the
original statement, the attorney lacks a good-faith subjective belief that
the altered testimony is reliable. If the witness gave no prior statement
or interview, so that the attorney has no objective basis for knowing what
the witness's natural testimony would have been, the inherent suggestive-
ness of refreshing memory with another's statement or the attorney's
suggestive questions deprives the lawyer of a good-faith basis for
'See Bakerv. State, 35 Md. App. 593,603 n. 12,371 A.2d 699,705 n. 12 (Ct. Spec.
App. 1977) (Generally speaking, the process of refurbishing a witness's memory will
take place as apart of astute counsel's trialpreparation. It is only when memory, through
courtroom fear or otherwise, unexpectedly bogs down on the witness stand-or when the
witness whose memory needs refreshing is one other than counsel's own-that the
courtroom becomes the arena for the refurbishing.).
201 See, e.g., United States v. Weller, 238 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2001)
(denying a witness's attempt to use an appraisal report to "refresh" her recollection of
the value of antiques).
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believing that the refreshed testimony is the witness's own recollection,
and the procedure is an unethical creation of unreliable evidence.
c. Witness Compensation
Lawyers routinely compensate witnesses in exchange for their
testimony. Bribing witnesses would seem particularly sleazy, unethical,
and likely to produce unreliable evidence. Indeed, several courts have
held that outright cash payments to witnesses is wrong. The West
Virginia Supreme Court held that it was unethical to pay a witness $6,500
who refused to testify without being compensated.2 °2 The Illinois
Supreme Court reached the same result, finding it unethical to pay law
enforcement officials fifty dollars.2 °3 In neither case was there any proof
the money was intended to coerce false testimony. The court found the
practice an ethical violation regardless of whether the witness was being
paid for false or truthful testimony. Hazard and Hodes state that "it is
well-established... that witnesses may not be paid a fee for telling the
truth, for that is their duty in any event."2°4
The courts and commentators have had some difficulty coming up with
an explanation of exactly why paying witnesses is unethical. They usually
state somewhat vaguely that "[t]he payment of a sum of money to a
witness to 'tell the truth' is as clearly subversive of the proper administra-
tion of justice as to pay him to testify to what is not true. 20 5 This is
202 Committee on Legal Ethics v. Sheatsley, 192 W. Va. 272, 276-77, 452 S.E.2d
75, 80 (1994).
203 In re Howard, 69 Il. 2d 343, 354, 372 N.E.2d 371, 376, 14 Il. Dec. 360, 375
(1977).
204 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING:
A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3.4:301, at 632
(Supp. 1998); see Golden Door Jewelry Creations Inc. v. Lloyd's Underwriters Non-
Marine Ass'n, 865 F. Supp. 1516, 1526 (S.D. Fla 1994) ("Quite simply, a witness has
the solen and fundamental duty to tell the truth. He or she should not be paid a fee
for doing so.").
205 In re Robinson, 136 N.Y.S. 548, 556 (1912); see also Fla. Bar v. Jackson, 490
So. 2d 935-36 (Fla. 1986) (holding that witness payments constitute "conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration ofjustice").
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usually expressed as a truism requiring no explanation.2 °6 Such banal
statements are ludicrous, of course. Paying for false testimony is
obviously wrong and unethical. It is not so obvious though that compen-
sating a witness for all the time, irritation, and stress of being a witness
is so clearly subversive of the administration of justice. When I was an
assistant district attorney in New York, I frequently had to abandon
prosecutions because witnesses would not testify. Some were afraid, but
others simply could not take the time from work and family to be
commuting around New York City for various hearings, depositions,
grand jury appearances and trials. I could have done more for the proper
administration of justice if I had been allowed to pay them.
It is also sometimes suggested that payments to witnesses constitute
bribery,2" and it is unethical for an attorney to violate a criminal law 8
or "offer an inducement.., that is prohibited by law."2°9 However,
bribery generally requires as an element of corruption-the giving of
something of value for false testimony or to influence the witness to
change or alter testimony."' Payments to witnesses for their expenses,
time and trouble, as an inducement for them to cooperate and tell the
truth, do not constitute bribery as long as the payments are "reason-
able."' '
One reason the issue of witness payments has been elusive has been
the focus in the literature on the false evidence rule. Paying a witness for
truthful testimony in order to do everything possible for a client would
seem almost required under the view that all zealous advocacy is ethical
except presenting false evidence. And indeed, that argument has been
206 In re Howard, 372 N.E.2d at 375 ("The damage that would immediately accrue
to our system of justice, should it be acceptable to pay for truthful testimony, is
manifest."); In re Kein, 69 I. 2d 355, 361,372 N.E.2d 377,378, 14 In. Dec. 365,379
(1977) (stating that the court "[did] not find persuasive respondent's argument that
payment for 'truthful' testimony is less harmful to our judicial system than is payment
for false testimony or fabrication of evidence").
207 Harris, supra note 177, at 9-12.
20' MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCr R. 8.4(b)-(c) (1983).
209 Id. R. 3.4(b).
2
'o E.g., Golden Door Jewelry Creation v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Ass'n.,
865 F. Supp. 1516, 1524 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
211 See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2001).
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made to justify the two most common situations in which witnesses are
generously compensated: prosecutors buying the testimony of accompli-
ces with greatly reduced sentences, and tort lawyers hiring slews of
"expert" consultants, both vaguely troubling practices.
The good-faith principle may be a better vehicle for analyzing the
ethics of witness payments, because it does not distinguish between
payments producing false testimony and perjury, and payments producing
unreliable testimony. Paying money to a witness provides an inducement
for the witness to give favorable testimony for the party providing the
payments. Even if the testimony would have been favorable anyway, it
induces exaggeration and an effort to make it even more favorable. This
makes the testimony unreliable. All trial lawyers know this. The first
thing we do when the other side pays its witnesses is to bring out that fact
on cross-examination to impeach the witness's credibility. We argue in
closing that the testimony was bought and paid for, is unreliable, and
should be ignored. If we recognize that paid witnesses are unreliable
when our opponent pays them, we must also recognize it when we pay
our own witnesses. A lawyer who makes such payments can no longer
have a good-faith belief that the resulting evidence will be accurate and
unaltered.
This is probably the most violated rule of ethical evidence: civil
practitioners routinely enter into "Mary Carter agreements," giving
potential opposing parties lenient settlement terms in exchange for their
testimony.212 Prosecutors routinely offer deals to accomplices exchanging
lenient treatment for testimony against a co-defendant. The lenient
treatment may be a grant of immunity, a recommendation for leniency,
or even a cash reward.21 3 The sine qua non of all such agreements is that
212 See American Med. Int'l Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 244 F.3d 715, 718 n. 1
(9th Cir. 2001) (stating an arrangement between a plaintiff and a defendant whereby the
exposure of liability of the settling defendant is limited, "usually in some inverse ratio
to the amount of recovery which the plaintiff is able to make against the non-settling
defendant or defendants" (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 974 (6thed. 1990)). The
term comes from the case of Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. App.
1967).
2See Bryan S. Gowdy, Leniency Bribes: Justifying the Federal Practice of Offering
Leniencyfor Testimony, 60 LA. L. REv. 447,462-67 (2000) (describing various common
forms of leniency).
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214the testimony of the witness will be helpful to the lawyer's case.
Attorneys defend the practice as being necessary to obtain truthful
testimony from a witness who would otherwise withhold it because of
self-interest. However, if the truthfulness of the testimony does not
permit an outright cash payment, it does not permit other valuable
compensation. Evidence that a witness has made a favorable settlement
is, like direct payment, admissible to impeach."' To the extent that any
rewards are continent upon the outcome of the trial, the inducement seems
particularly strong.
As a general matter, an attorney would seem to lack a good-faith basis
for using testimony that has been bought for two reasons. First, compen-
sation makes favorable testimony unreliable. It is as likely to be the result
of quid pro quo as it is to be the witness's genuine recollection. The
attorney lacks a subjective good-faith belief in its accuracy. Second, the
attorney will in most cases lack an objective factual basis for it. The
potential defendant will usually have given initial statements to police
or investigators denying any inolvement in the event. Only after being
compensated will the witness recant that initial statement and start to
remember that the witness was indeed involved, but it was all a co-
defendant's fault. Thus, the attorney is seeking to present evidence that
is not supported by the witness's original written statement. Presenting
such testimony is unethical.
I am aware that most courts hold this kind of testimony admissible. 6
However, "admissible" is not the same thing as "ethical." Courts
acknowledge that compensated testimony is unreliable, but suggest that
the danger of false testimony is adequately mitigated by disclosure, cross-
examination, and cautionary jury instructions.2"7 I am unpersuaded this
214 Harris, supra note 177, at 18.
213 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 408 (evidence of compromise agreements excluded except
"when the evidence is offered [to prove] bias").
216 E.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,87 S. Ct. 408, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1966);
United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1300-01 (10th Cir. 1999) (enbanc); United
States v. Cervantes-Panceho, 826 F.2d 310, 313-15 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that
incriminating witness testimony is admissible and not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment when the defendant relied on the witness to maintain confidence).
2"7 Harris, supra note 177, at 20.
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is relevant to a discussion of ethics. The unreliability of the evidence
determines whether it is ethical to use this testimony. It is not. Whether
evidence is admissible is only one part of the good-faith basis principle.
To ethically use sich evidence, the attorney must also have a good-faith
belief that it is accurate. It is the latter which is lacking for testimony that
has been bought.
d. Compensating Experts
The problem may be at its height in the area of expert witnesses who
are given tens of thousands of dollars for favorable testimony. Perhaps
caught up in adversarial zeal, many lawyers see nothing wrong with
dangling a large fee in front of several potential experts to see which will
come up with the most favorable report.2 8 The Model Rules contain no
acknowledgment that this is even a problem, or that unreliable bought-
and-paid for evidence is being elicited every day from expert consultants.
Indeed, the Model Rules explicitly permit an expert to be paid for
preparation and for testimony in court.219 The only prohibition seems to
be against contingent fees.220 An expert who is to be paid only upon a
favorable verdict may be induced to give stronger or more positive
testimony than he otherwise would give. For that reason, ethical rules
have always prohibited such arrangements."2
If an attorney paid $10,000 to an ordinary witness to encourage him
to testify, the attorney would be acting unethically without regard to
whether the bribe actually produced false testimony. Yet there seems to
be nothing ethically or legally wrong with paying large sums of money
to experts to induce them to testify for your client. This distinction seems
bizarre. Why is an "expert" any less susceptible to financial induce-
ments? Three possible justifications can be rejected:
28 See id. at 37.
219 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 3 (1983); see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW § 117 (2000) (stating that an expert may be paid a fee).
220 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT KL 3.4 cmt. 3.
" RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF THE LAW § 117 (2000) (stating that an expert fee must
be "noncontingent"); see, e.g., Note, The Contingent Compensation of Expert Witnesses,
52 ND. L.J. 671 (1977); Note, Contingent Feesfor Expert Witnesses, 86 YAIEL.J. 1680
(1977).
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1. Experts are wealthier than ordinary witnesses and therefore less
susceptible to bribery. The problems with this argument are: (a) some
experts are wealthy because they are professional witnesses, and (b) it
is illegal to bribe a wealthy lay witness just as it is a poor one-the only
difference may be the amount of money needed.
2. Experts must be compensatedfor lost income that resultsfrom their
taking time away from their regular jobs. The problems with this
argument are: (a) Many professional consultants do not have otherjobs
to be taken away from; (b) many experts are employed by universities or
research institutes on yearly salary and therefore suffer no income loss
by taking time off to testify; and (c) ordinary witnesses lose income when
they testify at trial, but are compensated (if at all) only by statutory
witness fees. That is, ifaphysician happened to witness a traffic accident,
she might lose just as much time through interviews, depositions,
hearings, preparation and testimony without being compensated.
3. Many cases, especially personal injury and product liability torts,
could not be successfully prosecuted without experts. Most cases could
not be successfully prosecuted or defended without lay witnesses, too,
but we make them testify for free.
That leaves me baffled as to the ethical distinction between the two
classes. No claim can be made that it advances justice in anyway to have
a half-dozen hired-gun experts on each side to battle things out.
Experience has shown that opposite opinions of persons professing to be
experts may be obtained to any amount; and it often occurs that not only
many days, but even weeks, are consumed in cross-examinations, to test the
skill or knowledge of such witnesses and the correctness of their opinions,
wasting the time and wearying the patience of both court and jury, and
perplexing, instead of elucidating, the questions involved in the issue.2m
Current expert witness practice would seem merely to give an advantage
to the side with greater resources and seriously disadvantage a party with
a legitimate claim but limited funds.223 Nor is there any reason to think
that because it is an adversarial system, a defendant has a "right" to an
222 Winas v. New York & E.R. Co., 62 U.S. 88, 101, 21 How. 88, 101, 16 L. Ed.
68, 71(1858).
3 See Harris, supra note 177, at 37.
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expert if the plaintiffhas one. If a plaintiffhas been injured and received
medical care, we can subpoena the doctors who treated her and the
medical records, and the jury can decide on compensation. Ifa plaintiff
is not paying the doctor large sums, there is no reason to think the doctor
will routinely commit perjury on behalf on plaintiffs, so the defendant
will not have to bribe another doctor to give contrary evidence after
"reviewing the file." The whole current system is absurd. If there is one
area in which the evidence seems overwhelming that money corrupts
witnesses and makes their testimony unreliable, it is the area of experts.
The practice may be common, but so is cheating on income taxes.
Frequency is not the same thing as being ethical. Buying favorable
evidence from a consultant and presenting that testimony in court is hard
to justify as anything other than what it is-unreliable testimony tailored
to be as favorable as possible toward the employer. The attorney lacks
a good-faith basis for believing that the evidence is anything else.
224
E. Using Unreliable Evidence
Not Created by the Lawyer
The discussion thus far has assumed that the lawyer participates in the
creation of unreliable evidence. But suppose that is not the case. Evi-
dence may be unreliable through no fault of the attorney. For example,
during a recent panel discussion on the ethics of evidence, a lawyer with
many years of experience in family law asked what we thought about
using the testimony of obviously coached children in custody disputes.
He gave as an example a scenario in which the attorney sits down to talk
to a child and the child says, "Oh yes, before I forget. Daddy's behind
in his child support." The child then proceeded to give a well-prepared
narrative of all the evil things Daddy had done to Mommy.
Another example is offered by Alan Dershowitz:
[In the O.J.] Simpson case... Marcia Clark and Chris Darden... knew...
that the police account of the search was [dubious]. Everyone suspected
' See id. at 41-45. The abuses associated with expert witnesses "have been
accompanied for at least a hundred years by calls for reform of the expert witness
system." E.g., Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding
Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 53-56 (1901).
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Simpson on the morning of the murders. [W]hen I first saw the television
news of the two victims, one of them being Simpson's former wife, and
heard an account of Simpson's previous arrest for spousal abuse, I turned
to my wife and said, of course O.J. is the obvious suspect.... So everybody
suspected O.J. Simpson, with the exception of five people, that is, the five
police officers who swore under oath that they didn't suspect Simpson. As
Van Atter put it, I no more regarded O.J. Simpson as a suspect than I did
you, Mr. Shapiro."
Perhaps the clearest situation is the use of charlatans as "experts." The
leading example is a psychiatrist in Texas named James Grigson, who
became known as "Dr. Death" after he testified against the accused in
more than fifty death sentence hearings.226 In every case, whether he had
examined the defendant or not, he testified that in his medical opinion
the defendant had no regard for human life and was a remorseless
sociopath who would continue his violent behavior if released.2 27 In all
but one case, the jury then imposed a death sentence. 228 Dr. Grigson was
well known to favor the death penalty, and he could be counted on to give
devastatingly effective testimony supporting capital punishment.229
Prosecutors continually used him to give such testimony, without regard
to whether it was scientifically reliable, even after the American Psychiat-
ric Association condemned him and said that no psychiatrist could
accurately predict long-term behavior under these circumstances.230
Lawyers shop for expert witnesses all the time, seeking those who will
give favorable testimony and rejecting those who will not, regardless of
the merits of the case. The sad fact is that, even if all respectable experts
hold a contrary view, someone can be found to testify as an expert for any
view if one looks long enough.
225 Dershowitz, supra note 126, at 18.
Joseph R. Tybor, Dallas' Doctor of Doom, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 24, 1980, at 1.
227 Id.
2id.
2Id.
"3 See id.; see also Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass'n, filed in Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1090 (1983) (extensively discussing
and condemning Grigson's methods and conclusions).
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Is calling an expert known to be biased, who can be counted on to give
favorable testimony regardless of the facts, unethical? It does not amount
to subornation of perjury in the same sense as hiring a witness willing to
testify to anything for a fee because it does not run afoul of the prohibition
in Model Rule 3.3 against offering evidence known to be false. If
frequency ofoccurrence were the measure of ethical conduct, there would
be nothing wrong with this practice.
The good-faith principle, however, requires something more than a
shrug and the observation that everyone's doing it. To say simply that
it is ethical to present experts such as Dr. Death, and that doing so
complies with the minimal legal requirements of expert testimony, is an
incomplete answer. Having a legal basis for evidence is only part of the
good-faith requirement. An attorney must also believe the evidence is
accurate. Using a person to testify as an expert who can be counted on
to give a favorable opinion, regardless of the merits, is presenting
unreliable evidence that does not meet the good-faith standard.2'
Despite the fact that lawyers know they are presenting unreliable
evidence, they continue to do so in the zealous pursuit of victory. For
example, civil plaintiffs routinely use "consulting" experts willing to
testify for a fee that cellular phones cause brain tumors, abortions cause
breast cancer, television shows cause sociopathic juveniles to commit
crimes, or that Prozac causes suicide. Civil defendants routinely call
"experts" employed by them or an industry-funded research institute. For
instance, General Motors engineers might testify that the placement of
saddle-bag gas tanks on GMC pick-up trucks is safe, or scientists for the
American Tobacco Institute might testify that there is no proven connec-
tion between smoking and cancer. Criminal prosecutors rely on "forensic
experts" employed by the FBI or other law enforcement agencies who
give completely unreliable opinions on handwriting identification 3 2 and
231 See MARTIN L. NORTON, ETHICS IN MEDICINE AND LAW: STANDARDS AND
CoNFLIcTs, IN LAwYERs' ETHics 269-70 (A. Gerson ed. 1980).
232 See Mark P. Risinger, D. Michael Denbeaux & Michael Saks, Exorcism of
Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting
Identification "Expertise ", 137 U. PA. L. REv. 731,779-81 (1989) (concluding that there
is no actual scientific basis for handwriting identification).
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hair comparison.233 Criminal defendants call "experts" who make up
mental conditions like the child sexual abuse syndrome.23"
What is the solution? It is simple, but painful. As lawyers, we have
become addicted to something harmful for which we are paying large
sums of money. It is making the purveyors of bad evidence rich. We
must recognize it as an addiction and stop. Our ability to do this is
hampered by our self-delusion that because we do not know that the
expert's opinions are false (after all, they are they experts), we may use
them. If we did not use a crooked expert when everyone else does, we
may be disadvantaging our client and not providing zealous representa-
tion.
We must stop fooling ourselves that this narrow view represents the
whole world of ethical principles, and ask about the ethics of using these
experts under the good-faith principle. Under that standard, the most
fundamental, basic requirement of expertise is disinterestedness and
scientific detachment.235 An expert who is biased, makes a good living
as a professional witness, is testifying for his or her employer, or works
for law enforcement and is called by the State, does not meet the most
basic concept of an expert witness. The attorney lacks a good-faith basis
to use that evidence. If we are serious about ethical evidence, let the
parties or the judge236 seek the advice of a genuine expert. If that advice
is unfavorable, settle the case.
F. Incomplete Evidence
One final issue is worth examining that has not previously been
discussed in the ethics literature: Is an attorney's decision to present
incomplete evidence unethical?
23' See McGrew v. State, 673 N.E.2d 787 (Ind. App. 1996) (stating that the court
must be satisfied that expert testimony is scientifically reliable).
2' Fleener v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1140 (Ind. 1995) (holding thatexpert testimonywas
not proven reliable).
235 ROBERT MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 275-77 (1996).
236 See FED. R. EVD. 706 (stating that the judge may appoint an expert witness).
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One aspect of incomplete evidence is easy. It is unethical to destroy
or hide unfavorable evidence, or to refuse to turn it over in discovery.237
Model Rule 3.4 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not [u]nlawfully obstruct
another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal
a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer
shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act. ' 3s There-
fore, if the presentation of incomplete evidence is due to the attorney's
withholding it from the opposing party, it is unethical.
The harder determination is whether an attorney may attempt to create
a false impression by withholding evidence from trial. I am not talking
about the usual selection process, in which attorneys make decisions to
focus their cases on a few main points and not waste the jury's time with
irrelevancies or redundant witnesses. There is nothing unethical about
that, because the good-faith principle requires that the attorney believe
the evidence to be relevant and admissible in order to offer it.239 Evidence
withheld that is tangential, irrelevant, or a needless waste of time24°
presents no ethical issue.
The question is whether it is ethical to withhold material evidence
from the jury for tactical reasons, hoping that one's opponent will also
not offer it, and the jury will thereby not fully understand the scope of
evidence against one's client. It is tempting to adopt the view that zealous
representation in an adversary system relieves one of any responsibility
to present complete evidence.24' No lawyer must do the other side'sjob,
and as long as the unfavorable evidence has been made available in
discovery, the non-disclosing party can shrug and say it is not their job.
After all, they did not make an affirmative misrepresentation.
237 But cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW § 118(2) (2000) (stating that a lawyer
may not destroy evidence "when doing so would violate a court order or other legal
requirements").
2 3
s MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (a) (1983).
239 Id.
240 FED. R. EVID. 403.
2" FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 9-24. Cf Wolfram, supra note 76, at 833 (arguing
for a loftier view of the adversary system). But see In re Anonymous, 346 S. Ct. 177,
193-94, 552 S.E.2d 10, 18 (2001) (stating that claiming an improper behavior was
merely "zealous advocacy" will not justify it).
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The issue is not quite so simple, however, if the opponent is incompe-
tent.242 If counsel assumes her opponent will offer the evidence and he
does not do so, the jury will end up with a false impression of the facts.
The fact that the impression is false by omission rather than commission
is irrelevant. There is little difference between creating a misrepresenta-
tion through offering evidence or through concealing it.24 The fact that
there was no intent to deceive the court at the beginning is irrelevant. 2 "
If false evidence has been presented to the jury, and if the attorney allows
that false evidence to go uncorrected, the result is the attorney misleading
the court and jury. The attorney's obligation is therefore the same as for
discovering other kinds of false evidence-to take some remedial action
because the attorney lacks a good-faith basis for believing that the
evidence presented to thejuryis accurate. In the usual case, the appropri-
ate remedy is disclosure to the court.
VII. Conclusion
The ethics of evidence involve more than a duty to be a zealous
advocate and a rule against using false evidence. If that were all there
were to it, trial attorneys would be ethically obligated to present unreliable
and misleading evidence to ajury in an effort to deceive them, and to try
to smuggle inadmissible evidence into the trial by ignoring the rules of
evidence. Although some commentators have argued under slightly
different terminology for exactly this result, it is clearly unacceptable.
Ethics are not simply rules to be interpreted in the light most favorable
242 See Shack v. State, 231 N.E.2d 36 (Ind. 1967) (holding that the defendant's
counsel was incompetent at the trial court level).
241 See In re Huffan, 331 Or. 209,215, 13 P.3d 994,998 (2000) (en banc) (holding
that, in a disciplinary action, "misrepresentation" includes an affirmative misstatement
or an intentional failure to disclose material facts); In re Forrest, 158 N.J. 428,433,730
A.2d 340, 343 (1999) (stating that an attorney has an affirmative duty to disclose
material facts); see also ERIC M. HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE 2D § 4.34 (1996) (stating that a party to an insurance contract violates the
duty to act in good faith by either misrepresentation or concealment of material fact;
they are the same thing).
244 In re Huffman, 331 Or. 209,215, 13 P.3d 994,998 (2000) (suspending an attorney
for two years for deceiving the court) (en banc).
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to clients, but moral principles that are supposed to guide our behavior
as members of an honorable profession.
The ethic that proves the most helpful in analyzing how attorneys
gather, prepare and present evidence is the good-faith principle. Lawyers
have an obligation to present only evidence believed to be the truthful,
unaltered, natural recollection of witnesses, and which is admissible under
the rules of evidence. They should not fabricate evidence or use false
evidence fabricated by a client. They should not manipulate evidence in
a way that misleads the jury. They should not create unreliable evidence
through suggestive preparation techniques or outright bribery. Theyhave
an obligation to make sure that all material evidence is before the jury.
Underwood is wrong when he says there is no rule against trickery. The
good-faith principle is expressed in a dozen ways throughout the Model
Rules, and it should play a more prominent role in the evidentiary
decisions we make.
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